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The First Amendment and the Homeless
INTRODUCTION
A. The Homeless, Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment
In the decade since the wan face of homelessness captured the
attention of the American public, the number of homeless people
in the United States has escalated.' In 1984, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development released its first estimates of the
size of the homeless population, admitting that somewhere
between 250,000 and 350,000 people were homeless.2 Since 1984,
studies indicate that this number has increased ten-fold, and it is
now estimated that as many as three million people living in the
United States are homeless.' Perhaps the most distressing demo-
1 The escalation in the number of homeless is not, of course, limited to the
United States. Indeed, hard economic times and the disintegration of nations
have left Europe with hundreds of thousands of homeless people. Patrick
McDowell, Homeless Haunt Europe, S.J. MERCURY NEws, Feb. 17, 1992, at 2A.
Exact figures are elusive, but European agencies that deal with the homeless
problem say the situation has been getting worse since the mid-1980s. Id.
Even more alarming, according to a World Health Organization study
released in April 1993, the number of homeless street children vary from 10
million to 100 million worldwide, depending on how they are defined. World's
Stree Children Turning To Drugs, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 26, 1993, at 2A
(basing estimates on research and 550 interviews in ten cities including the
following: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Alexandria and Cairo, Egypt; Tegucigalpa,
Honduras; Montreal, Toronto; Manila, The Philippines; Bombay, India;
Mexico City, Mexico; Lusaka, Zambia).
2 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., A RPT. TO THE SECRETARY ON THE
HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHELTERS 18 (1984). The HUD Report was based
on interviews with service providers in sixty cities who were asked to estimate
the number of homeless individuals in their areas. This methodology was
criticized by advocates for the homeless who asserted that the actual number
of homeless exceeded the HUD estimates. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("homelessness is a widespread problem, often ignored, that confronts its
victims with life threatening deprivations") (citing Brief for National Coalition
for the Homeless, Amicus Curiae at 3 (noting that "estimates on the number of
homeless persons in the United States range from two to three million"));
Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that advocacy organization lacked standing to challenge HUD
report as "improperly researched, unsubstantiated, and inaccurate"); HUD
Report on Homelessness, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Community
Dev. of the House Comm. on Banking Finance, & Urban Affairs and the Subcomm. on
Manpower & Hous. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
80 (1984) (finding that one 1982 report estimated approximately two million
Americans were homeless).
s Alexander Wohl, Gimme Shelter: Lawyering For The Poor, A.BA. J., Aug.
1990, at 58; see also Lee v. Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 332, 335 (D.D.C. 1988) (noting
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graphic statistic is that over one-third of the homeless may be fami-
lies.4 Nationwide, surveys indicate that more than 500,000
homeless are children.5
As the number of homeless Americans grows, so has compassion
fatigue.6 The perception of much of the public is that programs
offering help to the homeless are unsuccessful and that the more
money communities spend on homelessness, the more this prob-
lem grows.7 As greater numbers of people become homeless, the
there are "approximately three million homeless persons nationwide,
including many families and children").
4 U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS RPT. ON HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES: 1990 25 (1990) [hereafter 1990 STATUS REPORT]. The
number of homeless families entering New York City's shelter system over the
summer of 1992 was almost twice the number seeking housing during the
previous summer. Celia W. Dugger, Twice as Many Families Seek Space in City,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at B3.
5 Tom Callahan, Bring A Van With Doctors In It, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 19,
1992 (Parade Mag.), at 12. Up to one million children may be runaways. Id.
at 12-13. A study by the Children's Defense Fund revealed that "[hiomeless
children experience more acute and chronic medical problems than do poor
children who have homes." Ellen L. Bassuk, Homeless Families, Sci. AM., Dec.
1991, at 66, 70.
6 In 1990, a survey of thirty major cities conducted by the U.S. Conference
of Mayors revealed three clear trends: the number of hungry, homeless
Americans seeking help is rising quickly; the ability of America's cities to
provide help is not keeping pace, and in many places the pace is declining;
and, the public's attitude toward the homeless is shifting from compassion to
intolerance and even hostility. 1990 STATUS REPORT, supra note 4, at 50-53. In
its 1991 survey of twenty-eight cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors said that
nearly three-fifths of the cities reported evidence of a public backlash against
homeless people. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, A STATUS RPT. ON HUNGER &
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1991 59-60 (1991); see alsoJames Bock, The
Homeless Aren't Who We Thought, S.F. CHRON., May 13, 1993, at B3 (citing Alice
Baum's and Doug Brynes' forthcoming book, A NATION IN DENAL: THE
TRUTH ABOUT HOMELESSNESS (stating that Americans have grown "weary,
angry and, in some cases, bored with the problem")).
7 Mary Brosnahan, Executive Director of New York's Coalition for the
Homeless, commented: "People are a bit weary .... They have heard all the
solutions for the last ten years but it doesn't seem to make a dent in the
problem." Opinions, Attitudes Hardening Toward The Homeless, S.J. MERCURY
NEWS, Sept. 2, 1991, at 8A.
The results of the 1990 and 1991 Surveys of the U.S. Conference of Mayors
seem to validate the public's perception that the problems of homelessness
and poverty remain unsolved. The Mayors' surveys revealed that requests for
emergency food rose by 22% in 1990 and by 26% in 1991. Homeless Problem
Worsening, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 1991, at A2; Robert A. Rankin, Homelessness
Rises As Tolerance Declines, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 20, 1990 at 1A. Demands
[Vol. 27:255
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backlash increases. Empathy in the United States is turning into
intolerance as Americans seek to impose harsher restrictions on
homeless people to reduce their visibility.' If society cannot solve
for emergency shelter increased 24% overall in 1990 and 13% in 1991,
including 17% for homeless families. Id.; Homeless Problem Worsening, supra, at
A2. As Chairman of the U.S. Conference of Mayor's Task Force on Hunger
and Homelessness, St. Paul, Minnesota, MayorJames Scheibel notes that this is
the ninth consecutive year in which the survey has found an increase in
requests for emergency shelter. Steven A. Holmes, Homelessness Rises, But Not
As Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, at A9. Of perhaps more concern, the 1991
Mayor's Survey revealed that, on the average, 17% of food needs and 15% of
shelter needs are not being met. Homeless Problem Worsening, supra, at A2.
Indeed, in nearly four out of every five cities, hungry people are being turned
away from emergency feeding facilities. Id.
8 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35 (McKinney 1991) (prohibiting, as part
of anti-loitering regulation, anyone from "sleeping" in "any transportation
facility" who is "unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his presence"); SAN
FRANcIsco, CAL., PARK CODE § 3.13 (1988) (providing that "no person shall
remain in any park for the purpose of sleeping between the hours of 10:00
p.m. and 6:00 a.m."); Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomeless" Laws:
Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to
Travel, L.A. DAiLYJ., Sept. 28, 1990, at 2.
Much of the restrictive legislation seeks to hide the homeless from public
view. Regulations in many communities prohibit the homeless from sleeping
in public areas, such as parks or beaches, that would otherwise seem to be
ideal settings, due to the usually mild weather and the availability of toilet
facilities. See, e.g., SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUN. ORDINANCE 15.16.085(1)
(making it "unlawful for any person to sleep... [i]n any public beach during
the period of time from one-half hour after sunset to 6:00 A.M."). The
ordinance also bars the homeless from sleeping on city streets, sidewalks or
parking lots. Id.
In People v. Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986), the Appellate Department of the
Santa Barbara Superior Court found that the Santa Barbara ordinance was not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In reaching this decision, the court
commented that the "[c]ity acts reasonably in lessening the risks to transients
from other transients by restricting the areas where overnight sleeping, and
thus, vulnerability, can legitimately take place." Id. at 739. However, this
professed governmental concern with the well-being of the homeless seems
open to question because the measure permits the homeless to sleep in "the
jungle," a public lot overgrown with eucalyptus trees, where the homeless are
"safely" out of sight of the downtown boutiques. Opinions, Attitudes Hardening
Toward The Homeless, supra note 7, at 8A.
In September of 1993, the ACLU of Southern California sued Santa Barbara
as well as the cities of Santa Ana, Orange, Fullerton and Long Beach, arguing
that ordinances prohibiting overnight camping in public places are
unconstitutional. Making Criminals Of The Homeless: Overwhelmed Cities Turn
Against Beggars, SJ. MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1992, at lB. The ACLU also
University of California, Davis
threatened Santa Monica, California, with legal action if it made good on its
promise to prosecute homeless people pursuant to an "anti-lodging law
enacted during post-Civil War Reconstruction." Id. The advocacy group wants
to end what it calls "social cleansing" by the cities. Larry Rohter, Homelessness
Defies Every City's "Remedy," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at E3; see also Harry
Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional And Historical Analysis Of Official
Efforts To Drive Homeless Persons From American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REv. 631 (1992)
(arguing that courts must be vigilant of unconstitutional efforts to sweep
homeless from cities).
During the last two decades, a number of other lawsuits have been brought
challenging statutes that prohibit sleeping or camping in public. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In Clark,
the only one of these cases to reach the United States Supreme Court, a
National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in certain Washington,
D.C., parks was applied to prohibit demonstrators on behalf of the homeless
from sleeping on the Mall and in Lafayette Park. Id. at 289-92. The Court
held that the statute did not violate the First Amendment because the Park
Service had established other areas of the parks for camping and did not
attempt to ban camping entirely. Id. at 298-99. In addition, the "regulation
otherwise left the demonstration intact" and was not "any barrier to delivering
to the media, or to the public by other means, the intended message
concerning the plight of the homeless." Id. at 295.
Other challenges to statutes prohibiting sleeping or camping in public at
the lower federal court level and in state courts have met with mixed results.
At least three lower courts have found such regulations invalid. See, e.g.,
Pollard v. State, 687 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissing
complaint against homeless man for sleeping in public area); City of Pompano
Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (overturning
on vagueness grounds "a sleep in the vehicle statute" because "it leaves
unbridled discretion to the police officer" whether to arrest "wide range of
persons" who might violate the statute), review denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985); State v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180, 181
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (overturning as vague ordinance prohibiting
sleeping in public because it might "result in arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions"), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1973).
However, at least seven other lower courts have upheld such regulations.
See, e.g., Stone v. Agnos, 960 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no violation
of homeless person's First or Fourth Amendment rights from enforcing
statute making it misdemeanor to "lodge in any place . . . without the
permission of the owner"); Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 21-22
(1st Cir. 1991) (finding that ordinance banning sleeping in public outdoors or
in motor vehicles was not vague or overbroad); Hersey v. City of Clearwater,
834 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that ordinance prohibiting
"lodging" in motor vehicle in public was not vague or overbroad, based on
city's interest in "protecting the health, safety and welfare of the public");
Seeley v. State, 655 P.2d 803, 805-07 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding
conviction for refusing to move from public sidewalk, finding Phoenix's
"vigorously enforced" ordinance prohibiting "lying, sleeping or otherwise
[Vol. 27:255
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the problems of the homeless, at least the public can remove the
homeless from sight.' Moreover, public hostility toward the home-
less can unfortunately become life-threatening to America's indi-
gent citizens.' 0
The economic recession has fueled this public animosity, creat-
ing a vicious cycle of homelessness and joblessness." Many of the
remaining in a sitting position" on public land not vague, overbroad or
violation of equal protection rights of "inebriates and transients"); People v.
Mannon, 265 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1989)
(upholding convictions for sleeping without tents, finding ordinance not
ambiguous); Davenport, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39; City of Portland v. Johnson,
651 P.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that anti-public-camping
ordinance, enacted to prevent "unsafe and unsanitary living situations which
pose a threat to peace, health and safety," not vague or overbroad).
9 In discussing the diversion of transit police from robbery stakeouts to so-
called "quality of life patrols," which involve hustling panhandlers from
underground subway stations, Richard Penrose of the New York Coalition for
the Homeless stated: "I think people have gotten the sense that the problem
just keeps getting worse, the numbers of homeless people are just absolutely
out of control.... The danger is that people may be forgetting that life can be
different. Instead of solving the problem, they are willing to just shove it out
of sight." David Von Drehle, Urban Panhandling, MIAMi HERALD, June 11,
1990, at A12.
In Pottinger v. City of Miami, 720 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Fla. 1989), a district
court granted class certification to a group of homeless plaintiffs who had
been, or might become, victims of more broad-based "quality of life patrols."
On November 16, 1992, as a result of the lawsuit, U.S. District Court Judge C.
Clyde Atkins ordered Miami, Florida, to provide two "safe zones" where the
city's 6000 homeless individuals would be allowed to sleep, eat, and perform
other "harmless activities" in public. Making Criminals Of The Homeless, supra
note 8, at lB.
10 The New York City Transit Authority Police reported 21 incidents in
1992 in which people tried to set fire to homeless individuals sleeping in
subway stations by throwing matches, lighting newspapers under their shoes or
dousing them with flammable liquids. Michael T. Kaufman, 21 Reasons To
Simply Ask, "Wy?," N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 9, 1993, at L27. Two of the homeless
burned to death, and in all but eight cases the perpetrators escaped. Id.
Moreover, the homeless reported that burning incidents have also occurred in
skid rows and "hobo jungles." Id.
In Gastonia, North Carolina, three police officers pled guilty to charges of
assault and civil rights violations in connection with the harassment of
homeless men from January 1987 to October 1990. Police Abuse Of Homeless
Splits North Carolina City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A22. Homeless victims
reported that the officers beat them and doused them with cooking oil, coffee,
and urine. Id.
11 Allan Parachini, spokesman for the ACLU Foundation of Southern
California, noted that people feel economic pressure. "They want homeless
1994]
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employable homeless had been earning a modest living 12 until they
lost their jobs in the recession."i Other homeless people, although
willing and able to work, are unable to find employment. 4 Still
people out of sight and out of mind, and they're willing to do completely
illogical and illegal things to do it." Making Criminals Of The Homeless, supra
note 8, at lB.
12 According to the 1990 Survey of U.S. Conference of Mayors, nearly one-
quarter (24%) of the homeless worked full- or part-time. 1990 STATUS
REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, a full-
time job at minimum wage was sufficient to maintain a family of three above
the poverty line. NATIONAL LAw CENmR ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, GO
DIRECTLY To JAIL 9 (Dec. 1991) (citing AFL-CIO Department of Economic
Research, Monthly Estimates of Poverty Line). By 1991, a full-time job at the
minimum wage left a family of three nearly $2000 below the poverty line and a
family of four nearly $5000 below the poverty level. Id.; see also Nancy Gibbs,
Shameful Bequests To The Next Generation, TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at 43 (quoting Sen.
John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman, National Commission on Children
(indicating that official poverty line for family of four was $12,675 per year)).
13 In March of 1993, the index of leading economic indicators declined
1%, the biggest drop in nearly 2 1/2 years. Steve Kaufman, Grim Economic
Reports Signal Threat To Recovey, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, May 5, 1993, at IA. The
decline followed other recent discouraging reports, "such as a sharp slowdown
in economic growth in the first quarter [of 1993] and in job growth in March,
deteriorating retail sales, and depressed factory orders." Id.
Entire families, pushed over the edge by a combination of the economic
recession and the government's indifference, are forced into the dangerous
netherworld of the homeless. According to a November 1992 report from the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the plight of the poor is so dire
nationwide that "one major economic jolt, like an unexpected medical bill or
a sudden job layoff, can push these families over the edge into homelessness."
Housing Costs Are Staggering For Poor In U.S., Report Says, S.J. MERCURY NEWS,
Nov. 25, 1992, at 8A (quoting Paul Leonard (co-author of the Report)); see also
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIolrIS & FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, REAL
LIFE POVERTY IN AMERICA: WHERE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD SET THE
POVERTY LINE (1990) (studying Census Bureau figures from 1986 to 1989 for
forty-four of the nation's fifty largest metropolitan areas).
14 For example, California lost nearly 800,000 jobs between May 1990 and
October 1992, and economists believe that the state economy is in "its worst
slump since the Depression." Steve Kaufman, Economy's Down; Spirits Are Even
Lower, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at IA. In Michigan, 82,614 "able-
bodied" adults were dropped from the state's $240 million welfare rolls in
October 1991, on the theory that the vast majority of those bumped from the
rolls were undeserving of public assistance and should be able to find jobs.
Jason DeParle, The Sorrows, and Surprises, After A Welfare Plan Ends, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1992, at Al; Vanessa Williams, Michigan Welfare Cutoff A Shove Into The
Unknown, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 12, 1991, at 2A. However, with more than
400,000 people out of work statewide, few former welfare recipients were able
to find employment, leading them to join the ranks of the homeless. Williams,
262 [Vol. 27:255
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other members of the homeless population suffer from mental 5 or
physical 6 disabilities precluding them from finding employment.1 7
In addition, cuts in public assistance threaten the one remaining
source of support for many of the unemployed and the unemploya-
supra, at 2A. The Salvation Army estimates that the cuts increased
homelessness in Detroit by about 30%. DeParle, supra, at A16. Samuel
Chambers, the head of Wayne County, Michigan, Department of Social
Services, puts the figure at about 50%. Id. Critics of the Michigan action have
estimated that if 10% of the former recipients end up in prison or in mental
hospitals, savings from the cuts will be wiped out. Id.
15 The 1991 Survey of the U.S. Conference of Mayors estimated that one-
third of the homeless were severely mentally ill, up 7% since January 1990.
Mayors Slam Cuts In Aid To Mentally 114 S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 9, 1991, at 5F.
The 1991 Survey also found that the number of severely mentally ill homeless
who abuse illegal drugs and alcohol increased by an average of 9% since
January 1990. Mentally Ill Homeless Are On Rise, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1991, § 1, at
8. Furthermore, in 11 of the 21 cities surveyed, the number of mentally ill
homeless requesting space in shelters jumped by one-third in 1991. Mayors
Slam Cuts In Aid To Mentally Il, supra, at 5F. Boston Mayor Raymond Flynn,
President of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, commented that "[b]ecause of
budget cuts at the state level, we are seeing that the mentally ill who were
located in secure, medically supervised environments are being sentenced to
the streets across the country .... Homeless shelters and city streets have
become the 'de facto mental institutions' of the 1980s and 1990s." Id.; see also
Bock, supra note 6, at B3 (estimating that, as of May 1993, at least one-third of
homeless were mentally ill).
16 Many of the homeless have significant physical problems: 38% are
substance abusers and 6% have AIDS or HIV-related illnesses. Rankin, supra
note 7, at 16A (citing 1990 STATus REPORT, supra note 4). The 1992 New York
Mayoral Commission on Homeless for the first time studied substance abuse
by drug-testing 1000 of the 15,500 homeless in New York's shelters, in addition
to conducting interviews. Celia W. Dugger, New York Report Finds Drug Abuse
Rife in Shelters, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 16, 1992, § 1, part 1, at 1. The survey revealed
that 80% of the homeless men housed in New York's vast armory shelters and
30% of the people in shelters for families abuse drugs or alcohol. Id. A prior
survey of New York's homeless, relying only on interviews, suggested that
drugs were a far smaller problem since only 18% of those interviewed said that
they were currently using drugs. Id.; see also Bock, supra note 6, at B3 (stating
that over two-thirds of homeless suffer from alcoholism, drug addiction, or
mental illness).
17 A significant percentage of the homeless probably experienced their
problems with alcoholism, drug addiction or mental illness after they lost their
homes. According to a 1992 Stanford University study of 1400 homeless adults
in Santa Clara County, after five years of being homeless more than one-third
of those with no prior problems had become alcoholics, one-fourth had
become addicted to drugs, and one-fifth had been hospitalized for mental
illness. Laura Kurtzman, Study: Homelessness Leads Many To Alcohol, Drugs,
Mental Illness, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 21, 1992, at 8B.
1994]
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ble homeless.'" At the same time the stock of affordable housing
has dwindled. 9 Faced with no visible means to support themselves,
18 After adjusting for inflation, direct federal aid to cities for poverty
programs has fallen more than 60% since 1981. The WarAgainst The Poor, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 6, 1992, at A20. According to a study released on March 26, 1991,
by the Food Research and Action Center, a Washington-based anti-hunger
advocacy group, one of every eight children in America does not get enough
to eat, largely because of inadequate federal assistance programs. John Bare,
One of Eight Kids in U.S. Goes Hungry, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 27, 1991, at IA.
The two main state programs to assist the indigent, Aid To Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC) and General Assistance (GA), have shown a
decline similar to the decrease in federal funding. AFDC, established by Title
IV-A of the Social Security Act, is the main cash welfare program covering
families, while GA provides money to single adults and childless couples. 5
Million Now Get AFDC Benefits, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 1993, at A4 (noting that,
according to Department of Health and Human Services records, as of June
1993 families collecting AFDC benefits had topped five million for first time).
Between 1972 and 1991, AFDC benefits for a mother of two children with no
income declined by 41% in constant dollars. Richard Whitmire, Will The
Deadbeat Dads Finally Get Tracked Down?, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 14, 1992, at
4A. For a mother of two children who earned $7500 per year, AFDC benefits
declined 93% during the same period. Id. By the end of 1992, five states had
reduced AFDC benefits to poor families and thirty-nine states had frozen the
benefits, despite a 3% increase in the cost of living. Jason DeParle, States
Cutting Or Freezing Their Cash Welfare Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at A16
(citing survey compiled by Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in
Washington, D.C. and Center for the Study of the States at State University of
New York in Albany). In addition, many states tightened the eligibility
requirements for AFDC assistance. Sylvester Monroe, et al., How to Get America
Off The Dole, TIME, May 25, 1992, at 44; see also Ellen Goodman, Welfare
Conundrums, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31, 1991, at A17 (discussing diminishing
support for welfare recipients).
Funding for GA programs is more precarious. As of February of 1993, only
28 states had GA programs. DeParle, supra, at A7. Of these states, 14 cut the
amount of money paid in their programs in 1991 and eight more decreased
the amount in 1992. Id. After the cuts, the average maximum benefit was only
$215 per month, which would likely force some recipients, such as those living
in welfare hotels, into homelessness. Id.
19 Karen Schneider, Poor Hurt By Loss Of Low-Rent Housing, S.J. MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 12, 1991, at 3A (citing studies by Center On Budget and Policy
Priorities and Low Income Housing Information Service). According to a
November 1992 report from the Center On Budget and Policy Priorities, only
5.5 million subsidized or unsubsidized housing units met standards of
affordability for the nation's 9.6 million poor households. Housing Costs Are
Staggering For Poor In U.S., Report Says, supra note 13, at 8A; see also Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (1988) (stating Act's
purpose is "to meet the critically urgent needs of the homeless"); Lee v.
Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 332, 335 (D.D.C. 1988) (commenting that "absence of
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and in many cases their families, increasing numbers of homeless
are left with the choice of Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean,20 to steal a
loaf of bread or to beg for sustenance.
A homeless American who begs for sustenance is immediately
confronted by a backlash of compassion fatigue. The public's con-
cerns regarding begging have led at least twenty states and Wash-
ington, D.C. to pass anti-begging ordinances that preclude
solicitation by individuals for themselves, although some of the reg-
ulations permit solicitation by individuals for organized charities.2 1
In growing numbers, overwhelmed communities are dealing with
homeless beggars by trying to criminalize their activities.22 Faced
with these legislative obstacles, the homeless have turned to the
judicial system, claiming that anti-begging ordinances violate the
First Amendment right of free speech. 3
affordable housing is reflected by the long waiting lists for subsidized housing
programs: 800,000 households nationwide").
20 See VicTOR HUGO, LES MisErmBLEs 18 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1984) (1887).
Ironically, a homeless person choosing the former course, if arrested and
incarcerated for the theft, would at least be guaranteed shelter and three
meals a day. See Randy Diamond, Cities Turning Heartless On The Homeless, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 10, 1990, at Al.
21 John Sarna, Advocates Are Cheered By Ruling On Begging, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
12, 1990, at 17; see also infra notes 341-46 and accompanying text (citing
examples of anti-begging ordinances). Estimates of the number of homeless
who engage in begging vary widely. Compare Diamond, supra note 20, at A1O
(citing Michael Stoops, National Coalition for the Homeless (estimating that
nationwide only 1% of homeless "panhandle")) with PETER H. Rossi, DowN
AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HoMELEss 108-09 (1989) (citing
Chicago Homeless Study (indicating that 20% of Chicago's homeless reported
receiving cash, mainly in the form of handouts from public begging, and an
additional 9% reported receiving gifts, which may include handouts from
begging)). The discrepancies in statistics regarding both the number of
homeless, and the number of homeless who beg, reflect the difficult task faced
by researchers. The transient nature of the homeless population makes
accurate information difficult to acquire. Inaccurate information also makes
it virtually impossible for governmental policy makers to establish effective
programs for the homeless.
22 Michael Stoops, Assistant Director of the National Coalition for the
Homeless in Washington, D.C., states that at least 12 major cities passed
measures to curb begging during the period from 1988 to 1990 alone.
Diamond, supra note 20, at A10; see also infra note 400 and accompanying text.
23 The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been construed to make this prohibition
applicable to state action. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51
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B. The Homeless as Constitutional Castaways
It appears that compassion fatigue may also affect the clarity of
judicial decisionmaking, rendering the homeless constitutional cas-
taways. The federal judiciary appears less willing to uphold individ-
ual rights for the homeless or indigent than before,24 when lawsuits
helped indigent people establish constitutionally guaranteed
rights. 25
(1938) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance forbidding literature
distribution without written permission from city manager).
24 ArLynn Leiber Presser, Thinking Positive: Do We Need More Rights ? A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1991, at 56, 60 (quoting Judge Richard Posner of Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, criticizing extending rights to include governmental
assistance); see also Wohl, supra note 3, at 60-62 (commenting that recent
appointments to federal bench showed less willingness to "uphold individual
rights for the homeless or indigent").
25 For example, statutes designed to deter the influx of indigents into a
state have long been held to violate the Constitution. Over fifty years ago, in
Edwards v. California, the Court found that California's efforts during the
Depression to prohibit paupers from entering the state violated the
Commerce Clause. 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941). The Edwards Court stressed that
"[w]hatever may have been the notion then prevailing, we do not think that it
will now be seriously contended that because a person is ... without funds he
constitutes a 'moral pestilence.' Poverty and immorality are not synonymous."
Id. at 177 (distinguishing City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142
(1837)); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982) (holding that
statutory scheme by which Alaska distributed natural resources income to
adult citizens based on length of each citizen's residence violated equal
protection rights of newer state citizens); Maricopa Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (holding that Arizona's one year
residency requirement for indigents to receive nonemergency hospitalization
or county-funded medical care created an invidious classification that
penalizes indigents for exercising their "constitutional right of interstate
migration" by denying them a "basic necessity of life"); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 631, 641-42 (1969) (holding that state's one year residency
requirement for welfare was unconstitutional barrier on poor person's right to
interstate travel).
Other U.S. Supreme Court cases have protected indigents' right to public
assistance. See, e.g., Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)
(striking down Food Stamp Act of 1971, which denied food stamps to
households containing unrelated individuals); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org.
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (striking down, as a violation of equal
protection, federal statute denying AFDC benefits to households containing
illegitimate children); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (affirming
indigent's procedural due process protections by holding that AFDC benefits
could not be terminated without prior hearing). The Court established the
right of an indigent citizen to vote in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to
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The theory that compassion fatigue may be affecting the judiciary
is reflected in the chronology of a federal court challenge to the
New York City Transit Authority's Anti-Begging Ordinance.26 In
Young v. New York City Transit Authority, United States District Court
Judge Leonard B. Sand found that the First Amendment protected
begging.27 Shortly after Judge Sand issued his opinion, the public
and the press joined in condemning the decision.2 ' The New York
Daily News printed a cartoon of a subway platform overrun by beg-
gars with the caption: "It's really amazing how many federal judges
you see down here."29 The Metropolitan Transit Authority, in
appealing Judge Sand's decision to the Second Circuit, called it
"incorrect, unreasonable and insensitive to the rights of millions of
[NewYork subway] passengers" 3 who confront the dirty, noisy, and
dangerous subways to commute to work.31
In the Young appeal,3 2 the Second Circuit, in a 2-to-1 decision,
reversed the district court and rejected the claim of the homeless
one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."). Still other
decisions have overturned loitering and vagrancy ordinances that officials
disproportionately applied to the poor. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 361 (1983) (striking down, on vagueness grounds, as "encourag[ing]
arbitrary enforcement," California loitering statute that required any person
wandering the streets to produce "credible and reliable" identification when
requested by police officer); Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
171 (1972) (overturning Jacksonville's vagrancy ordinance on due process
grounds and commenting that the "rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as
well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that
holds society together"); see also infra notes 403-19 and accompanying text
(presenting examples of other courts' holdings overturning loitering and
vagrancy ordinances).
26 The Transit Authority's regulation provided as follows: "No person shall
panhandle or beg upon any facility or conveyance." 21 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 1050.6(b) (2). This challenge was brought by the Legal Action Center for
the Homeless.
27 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), rev'd & vacated, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
28 Court As Scapegoat, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1990, at 14 ("Columnists and
editorialists have jumped on the bandwagon, almost holding the judge
responsible for the mass transit hell under city streets.").
29 Priscilla Painton, Shrugging Off The Homeless, TIME, Apr. 16, 1990, at 14,
16.
30 Sarna, supra note 21, at 17.
31 Court as Scapegoat, supra note 28, at 14.
32 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). Youngwas
the first case challenging an anti-begging ordinance to reach the federal
appellate level. The Young decision spawned a considerable amount of
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plaintiffs. The circuit court indicated that begging in a public sub-
way system is not speech protected by the First Amendment as char-
itable solicitation."3 The court also expressed doubt about whether
the First Amendment protected begging as expressive conduct.34
The Young opinion is difficult to reconcile with either logic or law.
Beggars talking about their travails, holding up handwritten signs
asking for assistance, or sitting silently in the subway holding cups
engage in some form of speech. These beggars engage in expres-
sive conduct because they project a message that is likely to be
understood by those who see it. Furthermore, beggars' activities
provide truthful information about indigency and promote debate
on the public issue of homelessness. From a legal perspective,
these beggars' activities are either charitable solicitation or com-
mercial speech.
This portion of the Young decision is difficult to reconcile with
either common sense or with First Amendment jurisprudence.
This inconsistency suggests, perhaps, that the Second Circuit was
affected by the public outcry of compassion fatigue that greeted
Judge Sand's decision. 5 In fact, it is hard to reconcile this portion
of Young with the Second Circuit's subsequent decision in Loper v.
New York City Police Department. In Loper, George Sommers, counsel
in the Young case, successfully challenged the underlying New York
anti-loitering statute, which banned begging in all public locations,
discussion among legal scholars. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen,
Begging To Differ. The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. REv.
896 (1991); Susan Daniel, Note, The Second Circuit Refiuses To Extend Beggars A
Helping Hand: Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 969
(1991); Stephanie M. Kaufman, Note, The Speech/Conduct Distinction and First
Amendment Protection of Begging in Subways, 79 GEO. L.J. 1803 (1991); Scott D.
Sitner, Note, Beggar's Banquet: The First Amendment Right To Beg, 1991 DET. C.L.
REv. 795 (1991).
33 Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54.
34 Id. at 154, 156. The court opined that "even if begging and panhandling
constitute protected expressive conduct, which is in serious doubt .... the
regulation at issue more than satisfies the O'Brien standard, and thus is not in
violation of the First Amendment." Id. at 161.
35 An alternative theory for the rationale behind the Second Circuit's
decision was offered by Manhattan attorney Mordecai Rosenfeld in an essay
published in the New York Law Journal. This author suggests, in his ironic
analysis, that the court was furthering efficiency by banning subway begging.
In subways, he notes, beggars would be requesting help from the city's poorer
inhabitants. Beggars would spend their time more efficiently requesting help
from limousines. Mordecai Rosenfeld, Does Odysseus Ride The 'A' Train?, N.Y.
L.J., June 4, 1990, at 2.
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not just transportation facilities. The state regulation found a per-
son "guilty of loitering when he ... [ioiters, remains or wanders
about in a public place for the purpose of begging ... ."16 At the
district court level, Judge Robert W. Sweet held that begging was
protected by the First Amendment as both charitable solicitation
and expressive conduct and that it "might also be entitled to some
lesser protection as commercial speech.""7
In contrast with its Young decision, the Second Circuit in Loper
affirmed the district court's decision to find that "begging consti-
tutes communicative activity of some sort.""8 The court noted that
"[w] hile we indicated in Young that begging does not always involve
the transmission of a particularized social or political message, it
seems certain that it usually involves some communication of that
nature." 9 The court contrasted the Transit Authority's regulation
in Young, which prohibited begging only in the discrete confines of
the subway system, with the state statute in Loper, which foreclosed
begging throughout all of New York City. The court concluded
that the Loper statute was unconstitutional because the total prohibi-
tion of peaceful begging did not serve any compelling state interest
and left beggars without "alternative channels of communication by
which beggars can convey their messages of indigency."40 There-
fore, the Second Circuit's case law is left in a state of conflict and
confusion. Lower courts across the country have also reached
divergent results regarding the constitutionality of anti-begging
ordinances.4 The United States Supreme Court, however, has not
yet considered the issue.
36 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989).
37 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1037-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), afd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
38 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
39 Id. at 704 (citing Young, 903 F.2d at 153).
40 Id. at 705.
41 In Blair v. Shanahan, a district court found unconstitutional California's
1891 law banning panhandling. 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324-25 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
In reaching this conclusion, the Blair court held that the First Amendment
protected begging as a charitable solicitation, and that California's content-
based statute violated the equal protection rights of the homeless plaintiffs. In
1976, the California Court of Appeal in Ulmer v. Municipal Court, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 445, 447 (Ct. App. 1976), upheld a conviction based on a statute barring
"accost[ing]" others to solicit money because begging did "not necessarily
involve the communication of information or opinion; therefore, approaching
individuals for that purpose [was] not protected by the First Amendment."
However, the court noted that the legislative history showed that the statute
should not apply to someone who "merely sits or stands by the wayside" to beg.
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C. Charting the Course
Careful analysis of the constitutionality of anti-begging ordi-
nances is necessary to ensure that compassion fatigue does not
affect judicial rulings.42 This Article should provide guidance to
future courts by analyzing all aspects of begging in light of First
Amendment cases. From this review, courts can determine whether
ordinances that ban begging, but allow solicitation for charitable
organizations, can be reconciled with First Amendment
jurisprudence.
Future courts dealing with challenges to anti-begging ordinances
by the homeless, future legislatures trying to draft anti-begging reg-
ulations that pass constitutional muster, and future homeless plain-
tiffs challenging these ordinances should consider three distinct,
but interlinked, aspects of begging. 3 A comprehensive analysis
Id. In 1978, in People v. Fogelson, 577 P.2d 677, 680-81 (Cal. 1978), the
California Supreme Court stated that it was "evident" that an ordinance
"purport[ing] to regulate a very broad range of solicitation activities -
including acts of. .. begging or soliciting . . . alms or donations 'in any
manner or for any purpose' . . . reaches substantial areas of protected speech
.... " In a more recent case, C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 48-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), the Florida District Court of Appeal held that a municipal
ordinance forbidding "anyone to beg or solicit alms in the street or public
places of the city" violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Distinguishing Ulmer as involving an "accosting statute," the Florida court held
that the Florida ordinance was "unconstitutionally overbroad by its
abridgment in a more intrusive manner than necessary, of the First
Amendment right of individuals to beg or solicit alms for themselves." Id. at
48-49.
42 See Charles F. Knapp, Statutory Restriction Of Panhandling In Light ofYoung
v. New York City Transit: Are States Begging Out Of First Amendment
Proscriptions?, 76 IowA L. REv. 405, 406 n.11 (1991) (citing Baker, Subway
Begging: New York Advocates Seek Hearing, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, May 30,
1990, at 8 (asserting that court opinions that sanction anti-begging ordinances
have national implications because they condone efforts to hide
homelessness)).
43 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2567 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (suggesting as alternative to majority's "categorical approach,"
that Court consider a number of "factors in determining the validity of such
[content-based] regulations" including "content and character" of expressive
activity, "context of the regulated speech" and "nature and scope of the
contested restriction"); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network 113 S.
Ct. 1505, 1511 (1993) ("This very case illustrates the difficulty of drawing
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.");
John Paul Stevens, The Freedom Of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1307 (1993)
(criticizing numerous categories, tests and standards that pervade First
Amendment jurisprudence).
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should consider the content of the beggars' expressive activities, 4
the location of the begging,45 and the nature and scope of the anti-
begging ordinances. 4' Although the Supreme Court has not yet
determined whether the First Amendment protects begging by a
private individual, in the three years since Young the Court has
decided six cases with implications for the Court's analysis of this
issue.4 7 These decisions have clarified, complicated and, to some
extent, confused the legal analysis of the protection accorded the
beggars' expressive activities, the classification of the fora typically
used by beggars, and the constitutionality of ordinances attempting
to regulate begging. These decisions also pull in two contradictory
directions - expanding the range of speech protected by the First
Amendment, while contracting the number of locations where this
speech can occur.
Four of the Court's decisions since Young have affirmed or
increased the array of speech protected by the First Amendment.
In International Society For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, the Court
affirmed, without discussion, the protection accorded monetary
solicitation by organized charities, such as the International Society
for Krishna Consciousness.4" In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network
and Edenfield v. Fane, the Court reinforced, and suggested strength-
ening, the First Amendment protection accorded commercial
speech and personal solicitation.4 9 In Barnes v. Glen Theatres, the
44 See infra notes 62-227 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 228-279 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 280-419 and accompanying text.
47 Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); International Soc'y For Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992); RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992); Barnes v. Glen Theatres, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
48 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705; see also infra notes 96-128 and
accompanying text. The Krishna majority upheld a ban on solicitation within
airport terminals. Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2701, 2709. Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter drafted separate opinions cited at International Society
For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992). The majority also
held invalid a ban on distribution of leaflets within airport terminals in a fifth
opinion cited as Lee v. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, 112 S.
Ct. 2709 (1992).
49 See, e.g., Edenfield 113 S. Ct. at 1797 (reaffirming, in the context of
direct, uninvited solicitation by accountants, that "this type of personal
solicitation is commercial expression to which the protections of the First
Amendment apply"); Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511 (rejecting
Cincinnati's argument that "commercial speech has only a low [First
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Court extended the protection accorded expressive conduct to
nude dancing.5 ° Finally, in RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court
accorded some First Amendment protection to "fighting words,"
which had been previously categorized as wholly unprotected
speech. The Court in RA.V. overturned a St. Paul hate-speech reg-
ulation5" on First Amendment grounds, noting that a state could
not criminalize one class of fighting words, because of their race-
based content, and yet protect other fighting words. The prohibi-
tion of only race-based fighting words rather than all fighting words
constituted content- and viewpoint-discrimination.52 With RA.V.,
even if begging is not protected speech, the appropriate inquiry
would no longer end there. Rather, future courts must determine
whether the ordinance is content- or viewpoint-discriminatory, and
if so, whether the ordinance restricts all proscribable speech, or
only a portion.
Since the Young decision, the forum analysis of the context of the
beggars' activities has been transformed by the Court's decisions in
United States v. Kokinda and Krishna. While the Court has increased
the array of speech accorded First Amendment protection, it has
eased the forum justification required for government to prohibit
otherwise protected speech. In Kokinda the Court held that a post
office sidewalk was a non-public forum, and in Krishna the Court
held that three major airport terminals in the New York City area
were non-public fora. These conclusions allow the government to
regulate speech on merely a rational basis.5" The implications of
Amendment] value"); id. at 1521 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing the
"hope [that] the Court ultimately will ... afford[ ] full protection for truthful,
noncoercive commercial speech about lawful activities"); see also infra notes
128-85 and accompanying text.
50 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462; see also infra notes 210-14 and accompanying
text.
51 The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
RA.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE
§ 292.02 (1990)).
52 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2538; see also infra notes 217-23 and accompanying
text.
53 See International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
2705-06 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990); see also
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these two decisions for the homeless are frightening. The Court's
decision in Krishna that multi-purpose, metropolitan airport termi-
nals can be non-public fora may indicate that future decisions will
hold more and more public facilities closed for solicitation or other
unpopular activities. The homeless would thus be unable to beg in
any locations where the public congregate. The homeless and their
plight would be out of sight and out of the minds of the people who
might come to their assistance.
In order to avoid these dire implications, beggars must seek crea-
tive ways to challenge the constitutionality of anti-begging ordi-
nances. Perhaps the beggars' best hope of success lies in
challenging anti-begging ordinances as unconstitutionally restrict-
ing the content or viewpoint of the beggars' speech. At a mini-
mum, the homeless can successfully challenge anti-begging
ordinances, such as the regulation in the Young case, that ban beg-
ging by individuals for themselves while permitting such solicitation
by individuals for charitable groups.54 These regulations prohibit
speech on the basis of both the content of the speech and the view-
point of the speaker. Anti-begging ordinances that prohibit all
forms of solicitation may also be found by future courts to be con-
tent- or viewpoint-based if they permit other expressive activities,
such as leafletting or picketing. The Court's recent decision in
R.A.V. indicates that the Court will pay particularly close attention
to whether future statutes are content- or viewpoint-based. This
scrutiny may allow beggars to challenge ordinances even if they beg
in a non-public forum and the government can demonstrate a rea-
sonable basis for the ordinance. 55
infra notes 228-79 and accompanying text (discussing contexts of beggars'
expressive activities).
54 Section 1050.6(c) of the Transit Authority's regulation in Young
permitted solicitation for "charitable, religious or political causes," other than
on subway cars and in a few other areas "not generally open to the public." 21
N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6(c). Section 1050.6(c) also permitted utilization of the
public areas of the transit system for such expressive activities as "public
speaking; distribution of written noncommercial materials; [and] artistic
performances, including the acceptance of donations." Id.
55 Under RA.V., regulation can withstand constitutional scrutiny only if "it
is not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the
speaker's view." Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-06. Similarly, if the beggars'
expressive activities occur in a traditional or a designated public forum, the
question of whether the ordinance is content- or viewpoint-based forms the
threshold constitutional inquiry. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
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Alternatively, blanket bans on begging, like the anti-begging ordi-
nance in Young, are subject to challenge by the homeless on the
basis that the proffered governmental interests could be accom-
plished by regulating the objectionable conduct without prohibit-
ing all personal solicitation.56 In addition, blanket bans offer no
alternative means of solicitation to the politically powerless poor,
whose only opportunity to reach the public is through begging.
5 7
Indeed, because blanket bans completely silence the beggars'
speech, they may constitute presumptively unconstitutional prior
restraints as a priori restrictions on protected speech.58
Unfortunately, if challenges by the homeless are not successful,
and anti-begging ordinances are upheld, compassion fatigue will
have succeeded in making the homeless constitutional castaways.
Furthermore, many of these same issues and concerns also apply to
other unpopular individuals and groups whose speech the govern-
ment may seek to suppress. Although the Court's recent decisions
further complicate the complex area of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, careful analysis demonstrates that begging must be accorded
First Amendment protection.
Given the complexity of this legal area, this Article analyzes each
evaluative step in great detail. First, in Section I, this Article exam-
ines the content and character of begging as an expressive activ-
ity.59 Section II evaluates the context and forum issues implicated
by begging.6" In Section III, this Article discusses the nature and
scope of anti-begging ordinances.61 This Article's plea is that legal
analysis be employed in dealing with these issues and that future
judges not let compassion fatigue cloud their decision-making and
silence the voice of the homeless.
I. THE CONTENT AND CHARACTER OF BEGGARS' ExPREssrvE
AcrIITIES
A. The Content of the Beggars' Message
1. Introduction
The content of the beggars' expressive activities determines the
level of First Amendment protection accorded the speech. The
56 See infra notes 369-88 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 389-98 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 355-68 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 62-227 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 228-79 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 280-419 and accompanying text.
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Court accords speech on public issues and the dissemination of
truthful information the highest level of protection.62 An examina-
tion of begging's content confirms that this activity should be
accorded the highest level of First Amendment protection. The
beggars' message, and indeed their very presence, contributes to
the interchange of ideas regarding homelessness. Their presence
and activities also convey the truthful information that American
citizens are living as destitute, homeless castaways.
2. The Beggars' Message as Contributing to the Public Issue
of Homelessness
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was fashioned
to reflect our nation's commitment to wide open public debate6"
and free interchange of political and social ideas. 4 Historically, the
United States Supreme Court has "viewed freedom of speech.., as
62 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2569 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 2564 ("Our First Amendment decisions have created
a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political
speech occupies the highest, most protected position."); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (noting that expression of views on
issue of public importance "is at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection").
63 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (establishing
knowing falsity or reckless disregard as standard to hold defendant liable for
defamation of public official); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 309 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (commenting on
Court's "oft-stated recognition that the First Amendment was designed to
secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources'") (citations omitted); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1930) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people ... is a fundamental principal of our constitutional system."); Wolin v.
Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The framers of the
Constitution opted for the disharmony of controversy because they believed
that in that unrest lay the best prospect of an ordered society."), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968).
64 Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1861 (1992) (noting that the First
Amendment is "'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people'") (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our
independence believed .... in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument of force in
its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.")
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indispensable to a free society and its government."65 Therefore,
the Court attaches the greatest importance and supplies the great-
est protection to speech on public issues.' First Amendment pro-
tection is at its strongest when government seeks to regulate
expression of political opinions.
6 7
Begging contributes to the free interchange of ideas and to
debate on public issues. The beggar provides a unique and valua-
ble perspective on critical public issues regarding homeless Ameri-
cans. In 1991, a federal district court, in overturning as
unconstitutional California's century-old law prohibiting begging,
noted that the statute stifled "a form of speech possessing obvious
political relevance."6" The district court explained: "A request for
alms clearly conveys information regarding the speaker's plight.
Begging gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and
ideas on, among other things, the way our society treats its poor
and disenfranchised." 9 Moreover, the plight of the homeless
65 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979); see also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("For speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.").
66 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 154 (1983) (holding that discharge
of employee did not offend First Amendment where employee's
"questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited
sense" and was "most accurately characterized as an employee grievance
concerning internal office policy"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538, 2555 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (indicating that the "First
Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application" to political speech);
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1850 ("'Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.'") (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966)); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666
(1990) (noting that "the right to engage in political expression is fundamental
to our constitutional system").
67 RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that when
government regulates "'expression of . . . opinion on matters of public
importance ... First Amendment protection is at its zenith'") (quoting FCC v.
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984)); Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that statute prohibiting use of paid
petition circulators "trenches upon an area in which the importance of First
Amendment protections is 'at its zenith'").
68 Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-23 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
69 Id. at 1323; Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d
Cir. 1993) (noting that "begging frequently is accompanied by speech
indicating the need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care or
transportation").
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underscores the dismal state of the nation's economy.7" In order to
encourage robust and open debate, the political message in the
beggars' expressive activities must not be silenced and should be
accorded the highest level of First Amendment protection.
3. The Beggars' Message as Contributing to the Dissemination
of Truthful Information
The Supreme Court has established that another central purpose
of the First Amendment is to facilitate a quest for truth.71 The
Court defines categories of unprotected speech by whether the
speech fails to contribute to "the common quest for truth."7" Abu-
sive epithets and "fighting words," for example, do not receive First
Amendment protection because such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas.7"
The Court's concern with promoting the quest for truth is per-
haps best illustrated by the protection accorded the press for the
dissemination of truthful, private information, such as the identity
of victims of sexual offenses. For example, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,7 a
the Court found unconstitutional a Florida statute imposing civil
70 The political relevance of the nation's economy was apparent in the 1992
Presidential election debates, which focused repeatedly on this issue and
turned the phrase, "It's the economy, stupid," into a political rallying cry.
71 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-504 (1984)
(concluding that to find publisher liable for product disparagement of
loudspeaker system, public figure petitioner needed to show proof of actual
malice, noting that "the freedom to speak one's mind is... essential to the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole"); see also
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977)
(overturning ordinance prohibiting posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs to
stem the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community
because Court was "convinced that... the First Amendment disabled the State
from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful information")
(citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976)).
72 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-43 (1992) ("our society...
has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,
which are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality'") (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) (finding that addressing someone on public street as "damned fascist"
and "damned racketeer" constituted unprotected "insulting or 'fighting'
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace")).
73 See sources cited supra note 72.
74 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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damages on a newspaper for the truthful publication of the name
of a rape victim. The Court held that when a newspaper publishes
lawfully obtained and truthful information, that newspaper can be
punished only if the punishment is narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order. In Florida Star, Florida failed to show
this state interest.75 The Court stated that its decision was guided
by the Constitution's overriding concern for the dissemination of
truth.76
Indeed, in Florida Star and the trilogy of cases which preceded it,
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn,77 Landmark Communications v. Virginia,78
and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing,79 the Court consistently held that
a state cannot punish the news media for the publication of truthful
information.8" The Court acknowledged the strong state interests
in protecting individual privacy in Cox,8 public confidence in the
75 Id. The rape victim argued that the Florida statute furthered three
closely related interests: the individual "privacy of victims of sexual offenses;
the physical safety of such victims, who may be targeted for retaliation if their
names became known to their assailants; and the goal of encouraging victims
of such crimes to report the offenses without fear of exposure." Id. at 537.
The Court acknowledged the importance of these interests: "[a]t a time in
which we are daily reminded of the tragic reality of rape, it is undeniable that
these are highly significant interests." Id. Nevertheless, the Court found that
these interests were not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the First
Amendment right to disseminate truthful information. Id.; see also Globe
Newspaper v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (recognizing
that state's interests in psychological and physical well-being of rape victim
may be sufficiently compelling tojustify closure of public rape trial on case-by-
case basis); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("[s]hort of homicide,
[rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self"); State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305, 309
(1948) ("it is considered that it is a matter of common knowledge that [rape]
victims suffer far beyond anything suffered by men or women in connection
with other classes of crimes").
76 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 491 (1975)).
77 420 U.S. at 469.
78 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
79 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
80 F/orida Star, 491 U.S. at 530; see also Oklahoma Publishing v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (finding unconstitutional state court's pretrial
order enjoining media from publishing name or photograph of eleven-year-
old boy charged with second degree murder obtained from closed detention
hearing).
81 Cox, 420 U.S. at 496. In Cox, the Court found unconstitutional a civil
damages award entered against a television station for broadcasting the name
of a seventeen-year-old rape-murder victim. Id.
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judiciary in Landmark, 2 and the rehabilitation of juvenile defen-
dants in Daily Mail83 Even so, the Court has never approved crimi-
nal sanctions or civil damage awards against the news media as a
means of furthering such interests. In fact, the dissenting Justices
in Florida Star recognized that the trend has been to hold against an
individual's right to keep truthful information private if the press
wishes to publish that information. 4
The Court's concern with the dissemination of truth is also illus-
trated by the Court's solicitude towards truthful publications in def-
amation cases. In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,85 the Supreme
Court allocated the burden of proof of falsity in libel cases to pri-
vate figure plaintiffs, rather than requiring the defense to prove the
statement's truth. The Court premised this ruling on a constitu-
tional requirement giving preference to truthful publications.86
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, felt that the majority had fashioned a
rule to overturn any law if it excluded any true expression from the
82 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 833. In Landmark, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to publication of the name of a judge under
investigation by a state judicial review commission even though the
information was "withheld by law from the public domain," and the
newspaper's source apparently breached a statutory duty of confidentiality. Id.
at 841. The Court held that the state's interests in maintaining confidentiality
to protect the reputation of its judges and the institutional integrity of its
courts was not sufficient to justify "repressing speech that would otherwise be
free." Id. at 842 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
83 Daily Mai4 443 U.S. at 104. In Daily Mail, the Court found
unconstitutional the indictment of two newspapers for violating a state statute
forbidding newspapers "to publish, without written approval of the juvenile
court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender." Id. at 106. In
this case, protection for truthful publication was extended to a situation in
which the information was obtained from interviews, inter alia, with police and
an assistant prosecutor, both of whom were under a statutory duty not to
disclose the information. Id. at 99-100.
84 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 553 (White, J., dissenting); see also Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(noting that "[u]ntil today the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection
to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely
held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional
protection whatsoever").
85 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
86 Id. at 776 ("where the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe
that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true
speech").
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public.8 7 Moreover, the Hepps Court cited with approval the rule
previously stated in Garrison v. Louisiana, that "[t]ruth may not be
the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of
public affairs is concerned." 8
The constitutional protection afforded the dissemination of
truthful information, in both defamation and the publication of
private facts, should also apply to beggars' speech. Most beggars
are just what they appear to be - destitute and desperate individu-
als. The information they convey is truthful - they are homeless
and they are not being helped by a compassion-fatigued society.
Begging offers truthful information to help the public under-
stand the complex problems of homelessness and indigency. More-
over, the presence of beggars in society is an essential part of the
exposition of ideas. Their very existence demonstrates that our
society has failed some of its members. The social interest in order
and morality is furthered by the public's receipt of the beggar's
message.8 9 The district court in Blair v. Shanahan noted that "in
87 Id. at 786-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Court interpreted First
Amendment as "tantamount to a command that no rule of law can stand if it
will exclude any true speech from the public domain").
88 Id. at 777 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)). In
Garrison, the Court struck down a Louisiana criminal libel statute that
permitted prosecution of true statements. The Court determined that "the
interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest,
secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth." Garison, 379 U.S.
at 73.
Even if the published statement is false, a defendant would still be protected
from liability for presumed or punitive damages unless the private individual
plaintiff could prove that the statement was published with knowing falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974) (reversing libel judgment against magazine for implying that private
individual plaintiff had criminal record and was "Communist-fronter" because
the jury did not apply proper constitutional standards). The press would be
protected from actual damages unless the plaintiff could prove the statement
was published with some degree of fault. Id. at 349. The Gertz Court rejected
the actual malice test for actual damages, reasoning that private individual
plaintiffs have stronger reputational interests because they have not
voluntarily exposed themselves to public comment and have less access to the
media for replies to the defamation. Id. at 338-39, 349-50.
89 In September of 1992, in overturning a New York State statute banning
begging, the district court noted that the beggar's message "is a critical
message that the beggar has a genuine and legitimate interest in presenting to
the public at large." Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029,
1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
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some cases, a beggar's request can change the way the listener sees
his or her relationship with and obligations to the poor."90
Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in Florida Star, Cox, Landmark, and
Daily Mail, the beggars' right to privacy is not violated by dissemina-
tion of their information. The homeless want the public to learn of
their plight. In addition, the crucial interests in these cases of pro-
tecting rape victims, maintaining judicial integrity and rehabilitat-
ing juveniles are not present in the beggars' situation. Nor is there
an interest in protecting an individual's reputation, as in defama-
tion cases. Indeed, if Young was correctly decided and the First
Amendment does not protect individual solicitation, a beggar
would be entitled to more constitutional protection for slandering
a New York commuter than for asking that same commuter for
some pocket change. It would be ironic if the First Amendment
were held to protect a beggar who makes false and defamatory com-
ments, but not one who disseminates true information about his or
her struggle to survive."'
B. The Character of the Beggars' Expressive Activities
1. Introduction
The character of the beggars' activities determines the amount of
protection accorded the beggars' expression. Many of the beggars'
expressive activities consist of pure speech, such as speaking and
writing. The beggars' spoken pleas for money have, unfortunately,
been part of the American scene since at least the 1930s when the
classic Depression-era song, "Brother, Can You Spare A Dime?"
gained popularity.92 The homeless also resort to begging on street
corners with simple hand-held signs, such as "Homeless, Hungry -
Will Work For Food."9 3 Beggars who engage in such pure speech
90 Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
91 Courts may extend press protections in defamation cases to other types
of tort actions, when the plaintiff's claim arose as a result of defendant's
writings or speech. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 (1967); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066
(2nd Cir. 1977); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988).
92 JAY GoRNEY & E.Y. HARBURG, Brother Can You Spare a Dime? (1932). The
song was recently reprised in a 1992 album. DR. JOHN AND ODE-TrA, SnuKE A
DEEP CHORD: BLUES GurrARs FOR THE HoMELEss (Justice Records 1992).
Proceeds from the sale of the album will benefit the National Coalition for the
Homeless.
93 Standing On Corner Doesn't Feel Good, But It's Their Lifeline, SJ. MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 26, 1991, at 5B. This practice, known among the homeless as
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are entitled to either the highest level of First Amendment protec-
tion, if the Court classifies their speech as charitable solicitation, or
a more limited form of protection if the Court finds their pleas are
commercial speech.94 Even disheveled, silent beggars, holding out
tin cups, are entitled to First Amendment protection for the expres-
sive aspects of their conduct.95
2. Begging Through Written or Spoken Words as Pure
Speech
a. Begging as Protected Charitable Solicitation
The Supreme Court has long recognized that charitable solicita-
tion is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.
The Court has found a nexus between solicitation and the commu-
nication of information and advocacy about political and social
causes.96 In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,9
a charity, denied a permit under a local ordinance, challenged the
ordinance, which prohibited door-to-door solicitation by charities
that did not use at least 75 percent of their donations for charitable
purposes. The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional,
because charitable appeals include information and advocacy and
thus further interests protected by the First Amendment.9" More-
over, the Court noted that without solicitation "the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease."99 As a result, the
Court concluded that the charity should be protected as more than
"signing," has emerged at shopping centers, freeway on-ramps, busy
intersections and outside movie theatres. Id.
94 RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2568 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
95 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
96 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799
(1985) (finding that literature sent to federal employees from advocacy group
was protected as charitable solicitation because it "facilitates the dissemination
of views and ideas" and solicitation of funds allow organization to
communicate ideas and goals).
97 444 U.S. 620 (1979).
98 Id. at 632. The Court reasoned that appeals by organized charities
"involve a variety of speech interests, [including the] communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the
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a mere solicitor of money acting to further solely economic
interests. 00
Five years later, in Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 1 ' the
Court again struck down a statute that included a percentage limita-
tion like the ordinance in Schaumburg. In Munson, the Court
directed the Maryland Secretary of State to issue rules to permit a
charitable organization to pay more than 25 percent of its gross
income for fundraising expenses, because Maryland's 25 percent
limitation prevented the organization from increasing contribu-
tions. 10 2 The Court expressed its concern that the statute would
restrict First Amendment solicitation activity that, although expen-
sive, also furthers the charity's goals.10 Similarly, in Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind,104 the Court struck down a statute
designed to regulate fees charged by professional fundraisers who
solicited contributions for the National Federation for the Blind.
The Court again noted that charities are dependent on the solicita-
tions for their continued existence.'0 5
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Young opined that "neither
Schaumburg nor its progeny stand for the proposition that begging
and panhandling are protected speech under the First Amend-
ment."'0 6 Rather, the circuit court felt that the charitable solicita-
tion cases focused on "the nexus between solicitation by organized
charities and 'a variety of speech interests"' with which organized
fundraising is "'characteristically intertwined."107 Unlike charita-
ble solicitation, the Young court held that begging was not charac-
teristically intertwined with the advocacy of particular causes and
100 Id. at 636.
101 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 967.
104 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
105 Id. at 799; see also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976)
(holding unconstitutionally vague a municipal ordinance requiring advance
written notice to local police department by person desiring to solicit for
recognized charitable cause, noting that statute gave "police the effective power
to grant or deny permission to canvass"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (overturning statute requiring license for religious solicitation
because regulation allowed state official to decide whether cause was religious,
concluding that such censorship of religion is denial of liberty protected by
First Amendment).
106 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
107 Id. (quoting Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1979)).
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views. The Young court instead noted that begging involved only a
menace to the common good. 08
However, the Young analysis makes little sense in light of the
Schaumburg, Munson and Riley decisions. Begging demonstrates the
Court's requisite nexus between solicitation and the communica-
tion of information and. advocacy.1 With their monetary solicita-
tions, beggars communicate information about their personal
plight and about the condition of other homeless individuals,
because of the inability, or unwillingness, of the government to
come to the assistance of the poor. Indeed, "[e]ven the statement 'I
am hungry' communicates a fact of social existence of some rele-
vance to public discourse." a° Beggars also engage in advocacy -
they advocate that society's more privileged members assume some
responsibility for those who are not as fortunate. District Court
Judge Sand noted in the trial court opinion in Young that "while
often disturbing and sometimes alarmingly graphic, begging is
unmistakably informative and persuasive speech.""'
Even though the beggar's object is to obtain money, the Court
has long recognized First Amendment protection for speech in the
form of a solicitation to pay or contribute money.'1 2 It also makes
no difference that the beggar will profit from his or her own
entreaties. In Riley, the Court explicitly noted that "[i] t is well set-
tled that a speaker's rights are not lost merely because compensa-
tion is received; a speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is
paid to speak.""' In addition, an organized charity, like the
108 Id. at 156.
109 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799
(1985); see also Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
("Begging can promote the very speech values that entitle charitable appeals
to constitutional protection.").
110 City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1342-43 (Wash. 1990)
(upholding Seattle ordinance prohibiting pedestrian interference, but noting
that "First Amendment protects the spread of information as well as the
spread of ideas," finding that begging was "fully protected speech") (citing
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632; Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,
796 (1988); Secretary of State v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984)), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1690 (1991).
111 Young, 729 F. Supp. at 352.
112 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 629 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 363 (1977)); see also Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 (noting that Court has refused
to separate component parts of charitable solicitations from protected whole).
113 Riley, 487 U.S. at 801; see also Munson, 467 U.S. at 955-56 n.6 (noting that
paying fundraising organization "to disseminate information does not in itself
render its activity unprotected").
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National Federation for the Blind in Riley, takes some of the funds
received and applies them to administrative expenses. The beggar
has no administrative expenses.
114
Moreover, to assert that solicitations for money by beggars have
less communicative content than solicitations by organized charities
is to differentiate on the basis of the speech's source. The Supreme
Court has held that speech's capacity to inform the public "does
not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union or individual."" 5 No meaningful distinction can
be drawn, for First Amendment purposes, between a professional
fundraiser, requesting a donation on behalf of a charitable organi-
zation, and a similar request by a destitute individual on her own
behalf." 6 This distinction would lead to the anomalous result that
two homeless people could solicit donations for each other but a
solitary homeless person could not solicit contributions for herself.
As the district court noted in Blair, simply because beggars repre-
sents themselves and "not an organized charity should not render
[their] speech unprotected."" 7 Therefore, each individual beggar
should be viewed as an independent charity, and begging should be
indistinguishable from charitable solicitation for First Amendment
purposes.
In addition, the modus operandi for charitable solicitors and beg-
gars are virtually identical. In the Young case's trial opinion, Judge
Sand noted that both solicitors and beggars approach people,
request donations, and perhaps explain why they want money." 8
114 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
115 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (finding
unconstitutional Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting business
corporations from making expenditures for purpose of influencing voters).
116 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993)
("The former are communicating the needs of others while the latter are
communicating their personal needs .... The distinction is not a significant
one for First Amendment purposes.").
117 Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1323 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting
that "an individual with AIDS should be allowed to solicit food for himselfjust
as a group of individuals with AIDS should be able to band together to form a
food bank that solicits food for its members"); Loper, 999 F.2d at 705 (noting
that member of charitable organization who seeks alms for the organization
"should be treated no differently from one who begs for his or her own
account").
118 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), rev'd & vacated, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
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Even if the professional fundraiser's message is clearer, "First
Amendment protections should not be limited to the articulate." 1 9
Moreover, it is irrelevant that beggars may fail to persuade their
listeners, for "many charitable solicitors [also] fail to educate,
enlighten, or persuade their listeners."12 °
Furthermore, charitable and personal solicitors both seek contri-
butions for the benefit of society's less fortunate members. The
donor's contribution demonstrates support for the recipient and
her views. 121 Moreover, like organized charities, beggars are depen-
dent on contributions to continue their expressive activity. Most
professional fundraisers support themselves from the contributions
they receive. Similarly, the only way many beggars can support
themselves and their families is by soliciting funds. If beggars were
prohibited from soliciting donations, they would engage in fewer
conversations with passersby. Thus, laws that prohibit begging
impermissibly chill protected speech. 122 As the dissent in Young
noted, to suggest that beggars are otherwise free to pursue First
Amendment activity ignores the harsh reality of a beggar's life.'
1 3
In Krishna, the most recent United States Supreme Court case
dealing with funds solicitation by a non-profit religious corporation,
the Court gave no indication that it would reduce the First Amend-
ment protection previously accorded solicitations by charities.
Although the 5-4 Krishna decision generated four separate opin-
ions, each Justice recognized that in-person solicitation was entitled
to First Amendment protection. 124 In its majority opinion, the
Krishna Court noted that no party contested that the solicitation at
119 Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324; see also City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d
1333, 1342 (Wash. 1990) (stating that "the rudimentary nature of a
communication cannot deprive it of all First Amendment protection").
120 Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323.
121 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799
(1985).
122 Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1322 n.6.
123 Young, 903 F.2d at 166 (Meskill,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("To suggest that these individuals, who are obviously struggling to
survive, are free to engage in First Amendment activity in their spare time
ignores the harsh reality of the life of the urban poor.").
124 International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
2705 (1992); Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2721 (KennedyJ, concurring); Krishna,
112 S. Ct. 2711, 2725 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711 (O'ConnorJ, concurring); see also Loper v. New York
City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aftd, 999 F.2d 699
(2d Cir. 1993).
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issue was a form of protected speech.12 5 Justice Souter, in his con-
currence, recognized that the majority did not intend to limit the
First Amendment protection accorded charitable solicitation.
1 26
Justice Kennedy also implied that he would not limit First Amend-
ment protection to solicitation by an organized group, as opposed
to an individual.' 27 Thus, the Krishna case provides recent author-
ity for the conclusion that begging is protected by the First Amend-
ment as charitable solicitation.
b. Begging as Commercial Speech
1) Introduction
Assuming that the Court fails to find that the First Amendment
protects begging as charitable solicitation, begging should be
accorded at least the constitutional protections guaranteed to com-
mercial speech.'12 In Riley and Schaumburg, the Court determined
that charitable solicitations were not "purely commercial
speech."' 29 The Court thus implied that, if charitable solicitation
had not been accorded protection as pure speech, it would have
been protected as commercial speech.' The philosophical foun-
dation for constitutional protection of commercial speech supports
125 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705.
126 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2725 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("'We have held the solicitation of money by charities to be
fully protected as the dissemination of ideas.... [T] he dissemination of ideas
cannot be regulated to prevent it from being unfair or unreasonable.'")
(quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 803 (1988)).
127 Id. at 2721 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I am in full agreement with the
statement of the Court that solicitation is a form of protected speech.").
128 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 766 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (denying cross motions for summary judgment with leave to amend
upon further discovery); see also Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1038 ("[b]egging might
also be entitled to some lesser protection as commercial speech") (citing
Loper, 766 F. Supp. at 1285 n.5).
129 See Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
632 (1979) (noting that cases do not treat charitable solicitation as variety of
purely commercial speech); Riley, 487 U.S. at 795 (noting that speech not
necessarily commercial when expression relates to person's financial
motivation for speaking); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)
(holding that advertising low cost abortions is pure speech rather than
commercial speech because it communicates information of widespread
public and constitutional interest).
130 Loper, 766 F. Supp. at 1285 (noting that if begging not protected as
charitable solicitation, it may constitute expression that falls within
commercial speech doctrine).
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this conclusion. Justices have noted that the core purpose for the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press is to inform
the public."3' For that reason, "[i]n a variety of contexts this Court
has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information
and ideas.'"132 This public right to receive information and ideas
underlies the Court's extension of First Amendment protection to
purely commercial speech.' In City of Cincinnati v. Discovey Net-
work, the Court reaffirmed that "the interest in protecting the free
flow of information and ideas is still present when such expression
is found in a commercial context."3 4 In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court
reiterated that the commercial marketplace provides a forum for
ideas and information and that the speaker and the audience, not
131 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority holding that there is no "newsman's privilege" to
refuse to appear before grand jury in criminal matter to answer questions
about identity of news source or confidential information).
132 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (holding
that order closing criminal trial violated public and press right of access "to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw") (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 762 (1972) (upholding refusal to grant a visa waiver to scholar who
claimed First Amendment right to engage in academic interchange, as valid
exercise of plenary power that Congress delegated to Executive Branch)); see
also Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(commenting that the "preservation of a full and free flow of information to
the general public has long been recognized as a core objective of the First
Amendment.... It is for this reason that the First Amendment protects not
only the dissemination but also the receipt of information and ideas."); id. at
32 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that dissemination of ideas
accomplishes nothing if addressees not free to receive them); First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (noting that function of First
Amendment is to protect interchange of ideas).
133 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1512
(1993) (holding that societal interests served by information in commercial
speech); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) ("the free flow of
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be
regulators the costs of distinguishing . .. the harmless from the harmful")
(quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646
(1985)); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
567 (1980) (holding that suppressing advertising reduces information
available for consumer decisions, defeats First Amendment's purpose); Belotti,
435 U.S. at 783 (commenting that commercial advertisement is
constitutionally protected speech, furthers societal interest in free flow of
commercial information).
'34 Discoveyy Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1515 n.21.
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the government, should assess the commercial information's
value. 1
3 5
Moreover, the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases sup-
port the proposition that begging, at the very least, is expression
worthy of the First Amendment protections accorded commercial
speech."3 6 The beggars' solicitations fit within a broad commercial
speech classification that includes "expressions related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and the audience."1 3 7 Alterna-
tively, begging may fall within the narrower characterization of
commercial speech that includes proposals for commercial
transactions.1
3 8
2) The Evolution of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,'3 9 prescription drug consumers brought suit against the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy challenging a Virginia statute
declaring that advertising prescription drug prices was unprofes-
sional conduct for a licensed pharmacist. The Court, holding inva-
lid the Virginia statute, noted that "speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction'" is entitled to limited First
Amendment protection. 140 The Court noted that the First Amend-
ment protects commercial speech even though the speaker carries
the message for a profit, and even though the message may involve
"a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute
135 Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
136 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 766 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (cited with approval, Loper v. NewYork City Police Dep't, 802
F. Supp. 1029, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
137 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
561); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(finding this definition "unquestionably too broad" because "whether this
definition uses the subject matter of the speech or the motivation of the
speaker as the limiting factor, it seems clear to me that it encompasses speech
that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First
Amendment.... [E]ven Shakespeare may have been motivated by the prospect
of pecuniary reward.").
138 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513 (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989)).
139 425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976).
14o Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (holding that city's ordinance
forbidding newspapers to carry "sex-designated advertising columns for
nonexempt job opportunities" did not violate newspapers' First Amendment
rights)).
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money." 4' The Court held that the right of the press to publish
the price of drugs outweighed Virginia's interest in maintaining the
professionalism of licensed pharmacists. 4 2 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court reasoned that the free flow of commercial informa-
tion helps individual consumers make educated decisions and also
serves a general public interest. 1 3
Almost fifteen years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Commission,'44 the Court found that a state regulation, which
banned an electrical utility from advertising to promote the use of
electricity, violated the First Amendment. The Hudson Court estab-
lished a four-part analysis for commercial speech cases. 145 First, the
Court determines whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment: "For commercial speech to come within that provi-
sion, it ... must concern lawful activity and not be misleading."' 46
Second, the Court "asks whether the asserted government interest
is substantial."' 47 If the law passes these two steps, the Court then
"determines whether the regulation directly advances the asserted
governmental interest," and whether it is more extensive than nec-
essary to serve that interest.
14
Ten years later, in Board of Trustees v. Fox,'49 the Court refined the
last prong of the Hudson standard by holding that there must be a
"reasonable fit" between the state's substantial interests served by its
law and the speech restrictions. 50 Several lower federal courts have
interpreted the Fox standard as decreasing the Court's protection of
commercial speech.' However, two of the Court's most recent
141 Id. at 761.
142 Id. at 756. The Court explained that "the protection afforded [by the
First Amendment] is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both." Id.
143 Id. at 762-65.
144 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
145 Id. at 571-72.
146 Id. at 566.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
150 Id. "What our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends - a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served' ...
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but .. . a means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." Id. (citations omitted).
151 See, e.g., Chicago Observer v. Chicago, 929 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1991)
(upholding Chicago's ban on advertisements attached to newsracks); Don's
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commercial speech cases, Discovery Network and Edenfield, seem to
discredit this interpretation. In Discovery Network, the Court held, in
a 6-3 decision, that Cincinnati could not ban news racks containing
free advertising publications to promote its interest in more aes-
thetic and safer sidewalks, while allowing news racks containing
newspapers to remain."5 2 The Court rejected Cincinnati's argu-
ment that the ban on advertisement racks was constitutionally per-
missible because commercial speech is of low value." 3 The Court
noted that this view "attaches more importance to the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech" than First
Amendment cases allow, and "seriously underestimates the value of
commercial speech." 54 Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence,
added that Discovery Network showed the "absurdity of treating all
commercial speech as less valuable than all noncommercial
speech."' 55 Justice Blackmun noted that the advertisements, which
contained information about adult education courses and real
estate, had value beyond the offensive political slogan displayed in
Cohen v. California, yet the Court accorded greater First Amend-
ment protection in Cohen.'56 Justice Blackmun hoped that the
Court would eventually abandon Central Hudson's analysis, in favor
of giving full First Amendment protection "for truthful, noncoer-
cive commercial speech about lawful activities. " "'
The Court in Discovery Network also held that Cincinnati had not
established a sufficient fit between its goals and its chosen means, as
required in Fox.' The Court made clear that the law need not be
the least severe to achieve the city's interest. However, the Court
commented that "if there are numerous and obvious less-burden-
some alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is
Porta Signs v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir. 1987) (upholding
Clearwater's ban on portable signs).
152 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1509 (1993).
153 Id. at 1511.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1520 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 1521 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
157 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 1514. The Court noted that the law's distinction bore no
relationship to the city's asserted interest. Id. The Court stated that the
advertising newsracks were "no greater an eyesore than the newsracks
permitted to remain on Cincinnati's sidewalks." Id.
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certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit'
between ends and means is reasonable."1 59
In Edenfield, the Court, in an 8-1 decision, struck down a Florida
regulation prohibiting certified public accountants from making
any uninvited solicitation for new business, including telephone
calls and personal visits.' 6 ° The Court recognized at the outset that
"this type of personal solicitation is commercial expression to which
the protections of the First Amendment apply."16 Citing Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar, the Court noted that whatever detrimental aspects
personal commercial solicitations contain, these aspects are not so
inherent to personal solicitation that it loses all First Amendment
protection.' 62 The Court in Ohralik held that states "may discipline
lawyers for soliciting clients in person under circumstances likely to
pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent." 63 However, the
Court in Edenfield rejected the argument that Ohralik justified a
blanket ban on accountants' solicitations."6  Rather, the Edenfield
Court explained that Ohralik upheld a preventative rule justified
only in situations "inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct."
165
The Edenfield Court found that in-person solicitation by account-
ants posed none of the same dangers the Court found with lawyer
159 Id. at 1510 n.13 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989)).
160 Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1993). The Court limited its
decision to accountants' solicitation of business clients, thus not deciding
whether accountants may constitutionally be barred from soliciting
individuals. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding
that First Amendment protects "truthful advertisement concerning the
availability and terms of routine legal services").
161 Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
162 Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978))
(stating that the "harmful solicitation" in Ohralik was "inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct"); see also United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) ("Solicitation is a recognized form of
speech protected by the First Amendment.").
163 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
164 Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1802.
165 Id. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464). The rule was justified in Ohralik
based on certain "'unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers that
were present in the circumstances of that case." Id. (quoting Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1984)). Ohralik involved an
attorney offering his services to two eighteen-year-old accident victims, one of
whom was hospitalized when the lawyer visited her. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-
67.
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solicitation in Ohralik' 66 In addition, the Edenfield Court found that
the state failed to prove that the solicitation ban sufficiently
advanced the state's valid goals of protecting consumers from fraud
and safeguarding the accountants' independence. 6 7 Therefore,
the Court concluded that the blanket ban on accountants' unin-
vited solicitations violated the First Amendment.
3) The Beggars' Expressive Activities as Commercial Speech
The First Amendment protection accorded commercial speech
should also logically apply to protect beggars' solicitations from
blanket bans on begging. Like the electric utility's advertisements
in Central Hudson, beggars' expression serves their economic inter-
ests, and also "furthers the societal interest in fullest dissemination
of information." 6 ' Just as advertisers disseminate information that
consumers use to make private economic decisions, beggars dissem-
inate information to influence decisions about the allocation of
166 Edenfied, 113 S. Ct. at 1802-03 ("Unlike a lawyer, a CPA is not 'a
professional trained in the art of persuasion'.... While the clients in Ohralik
were approached at a moment of high stress and vulnerability, the clients Fane
wishes to solicit meet him in their own offices at a time of their choosing. If
they are unreceptive to his initial telephone solicitation, they need only
terminate the call .... In contrast with Ohralik, it cannot be said that under
these circumstances, personal solicitation by CPAs 'more often than not will
be injurious to the person solicited.'") (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466).
167 Id. at 1800. The Court stressed that, when the government seeks to
restrict commercial speech, it "must demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Id.
(citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648-49 (overturning attorney reprimand for
violating Disciplinary Rules, noting that "broad prophylactic rules may not be
so lightly justified if the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain
their force")); see also Bolger v. Young Drug Products, 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)
(finding ban on mailing unsolicited contraception advertisement does not
directly advance parents' interest in controlling education of their children);
In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982) (finding that private reprimand of
attorney for including in mailing non-misleading information not authorized
by Bar rules failed constitutional requirement that state regulate commercial
speech "with care and in a manner no more extensive than reasonably
necessary to further substantial interests"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980) (holding that ban on
promotional advertising by public utility does not advance governmental
interest in fair rate structure); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979)
(upholding restriction on use of trade names by optometrists because "State's
interest in protecting the public from the deceptive and misleading use of
optometrical trade names is substantial and well demonstrated").
168 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
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resources. 69 Although beggars only communicate some of the rel-
evant facts regarding the problems of homelessness and indigency,
"the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is
better than no information at all." 17° Moreover, the public's right
to receive this information is compromised by a begging ban. The
beggar is a prime source of enlightenment regarding the plight of
the homeless.
17 1
In addition, beggars' solicitations, if not charitable solicitation,
are properly characterized as commercial speech. The Court in Fox
stated that commercial speech is found when people "propose a
commercial transaction." 172 In Discovery Network, which involved the
free distribution of commercial handbills, 17 the Court held that a
transaction may involve a profit and still receive First Amendment
protection.1 7 1 Virginia Pharmacy established that commercial
speech is protected even though it involves a solicitation to pay or
contribute money.' 75
The only arguably missing element in what otherwise seems to be
a traditional commercial transaction is that beggars sell an intangi-
ble product. Nevertheless, the beggars' transactions are important
169 City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1343 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1690 (1991).
170 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 374 (1977)).
171 In Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68, the Court stated that communications can
"constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain
discussions of important public issues. .. "
172 Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (citing Virginia Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
173 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1508 (1993).
174 Speech "is protected even though it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for
profit." Discovey Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (overturning bookstore proprietor's conviction for
unknowing possession of book later found obscene, noting that "[i]t is of
course no matter that the dissemination takes place under commercial
auspices")); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)
(overturning law denying film license based on censor's conclusion that film
was sacrilegious, noting that First Amendment protects motion pictures even
though large-scale business conducted for profit); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (overturning conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for
selling religious material, indicating that mere fact religious literature is sold
"does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise").
175 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
761-62).
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to both beggars and passersby. The beggars offer a part of them-
selves when they extend their empty cups. The generous donor
purchases the satisfaction and peace of mind that comes from help-
ing another human being.
In addition, it seems incongruous to assume that the Court would
hold that the distinction between protected and unprotected
speech turns on whether beggars sell, and passersby purchase, a
tangible product or service. However, if the Court drew this distinc-
tion, all beggars would need to do is to sell a tangible good such as
a handmade drawing or a single flower that passersby could then
wear to signify their assistance to the beggars' cause.17 6
Begging also meets the threshold requirement of the Hudson test
for First Amendment protection - that begging "at least concern
lawful activity and not be misleading." 1" Sitting or standing in a
public place and asking for money is normally viewed as lawful. 178
Most people have asked a stranger for money to make a telephone
call. In addition, beggars' speech is not misleading. The beggars'
pleas are simple and direct. They are homeless, they are destitute,
and they need assistance.
Furthermore, unlike the solicitation by the attorney in Ohralik,
begging implicates none of the governmental interests the Court
has found valid to uphold regulation in commercial speech cases.
First, begging does not involve a governmental interest in prevent-
ing the dangers of "overreaching and other forms of misconduct"
that justify a blanket ban on individual solicitation.' 79 In contrast
with an attorney, a beggar is not likely characterized as one "trained
in the art of persuasion." Second, although a passerby may not
choose the time of solicitation, she is also not approached at a time
of "high stress and vulnerability" like the accident victims in
Ohralik.i s° Third, if the passerby is unreceptive to the beggar's
176 During the Depression, poor people sold pencils on street corners. The
modern day equivalent seems to be the "sale" of newspapers by the homeless
for a $1.00 "donation" in metropolitan cities like Chicago and San Francisco.
177 Commercial speech is misleading if it is false, actually misleads
someone, or contains a "significant possibility" that it will mislead the
audience. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1978); see also In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (using term "inherently misleading" to describe
commercial speech that meets "significant possibility" standard).
178 Obviously, some anti-begging ordinances represent a legislative attempt
to make this conduct unlawful.
179 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978).
180 Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1803 (1993) (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S.
at 465).
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solicitation, she can walk away. Under these circumstances, beg-
ging can not be found probably injurious to the person solicited.'
Moreover, ordinances that ban begging lack a sufficient fit between
the states' asserted goals and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends. 18 2 Governments may pursue numerous less-burdensome
alternatives than a complete ban on all begging, such as statutes
that regulate fraudulent, aggressive, or disruptive panhandling.
Finally, blanket bans on begging that entirely suppress commer-
cial speech are reviewed by the Court with special care, because a
speech ban may hide from public view the underlying governmen-
tal policy.'83 The Court in Central Hudson noted that "in recent
years this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial
speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either
because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity."' 84 Begging
is not deceptive, and the donation of money to the poor is not
unlawful. Therefore, blanket bans on the beggars' commercial
speech cannot be constitutionally condoned. If commercial speech
is constitutionally protected, begging is also protected.' 8 5
181 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 n.25 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
21 (1970)).
182 See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (adopting time,
place, and manner test for commercial speech cases from Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)); Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech
Analysis, 31 SANTA CLAR L. Rxv. 883, 935 n.296 (1991) (noting that "scrutiny
of ends in commercial speech cases is essentially the same as in time, place,
and manner cases").
183 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
n.9 (1980).
184 Id. Many of the Court's cases finding blanket bans on commercial
speech unconstitutional involved bans on personal solicitation. See, e.g., Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990);
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988); Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
185 City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1343 (Wash. 1990) (noting
that both Florida Court of Appeals in C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 48-50 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984), and Judge Meskill, dissenting in Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 164-168 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990), realized that "cases holding that commercial speech is protected
under First Amendment also precluded holding that begging is
unprotected"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1690 (1991).
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3. Begging as Protected Expressive Conduct
Some beggars do not verbalize their pleas for assistance using
either written or spoken words. Rather, these beggars sit silently on
street corners, or doze off, with the curb as their pillow, letting their
presence express their plea. They place a cup or other receptacle
for donations beside them. Because these beggars do not engage in
"pure speech," their activities are not protected as either a charita-
ble solicitation or as commercial speech.
However, the First Amendment also protects the expressive
aspects of beggars' conduct. The Supreme Court has made it clear
that government has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct
than in restricting written or spoken words.186 However, the First
Amendment protects expressive conduct if it contains sufficient ele-
ments of communication.1 8 7 For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines
186 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2568 (1992); Texas v.Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
187 RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (noting that expressive conduct may be regulated
more freely than written or oral communication); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). In O'Brien, the Court assumed that a protestor who
burned his draft card on the steps of a courthouse during a 1966 anti-Vietnam
War rally was engaging in expressive conduct. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
However, the Court found that a statute forbidding the destruction of draft
cards did not violate the protestor's free speech rights and "substantially
further[ed] the smooth and proper functioning of the [draft] system." Id. at
381. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that "a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
In subsequent applications of the O'Brien test, the Court has "highlighted"
the importance of the requirement that the "governmental interest in
question be unconnected to expression" and seems to have adopted that
requirement as a threshold inquiry. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407. See
infra notes 280-318 and accompanying text for an analysis of this "threshold
inquiry." Once this requirement has been satisfied, the Court has indicated
that the O'Brien standard is substantially equivalent to that applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions. Id. See infra notes 369-98 and accompanying
text for an analysis of the constitutionality of anti-begging ordinances as time,
place or manner restrictions. See also International Soc'y For Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2720-21 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[t]he confluence of the two tests is well
demonstrated by a case like this [involving restrictions on solicitation by a non-
profit religious organization], where the government regulation at issue can be
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Independent Community School District,'88 the Court recognized the
expressive nature of black armbands worn by high school students
to protest the Vietnam War. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,'89 the Court found expressive con-
duct in a union's peaceful picketing of a supermarket to protest
unfair labor practices. 9 °
In Spence v. Washington, 9 ' the Court stated the test to determine
whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative ele-
ments to enjoy First Amendment protection. First, the actor must
possess an intent to convey a particularized message. 192 Second,
the surrounding circumstances must create a great likelihood that
described with equal accuracy as a regulation of the manner of expression, or
as a regulation of conduct with an expressive component"); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (noting that
"the four-factor standard of United States v. O'Brien . . . for validating a
regulation of expressive conduct in the last analysis is little, if any, different
from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions") (citation
omitted).
188 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
189 391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968).
190 The Court has found that a wide variety of other actions are also
protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
715 (1977) (covering automobile license plate containing New Hampshire's
State motto "Live Free Or Die," protected conduct because First Amendment
protects individual's right to hold point of view different from majority);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (reversing conviction under
California penal statute for offensive conduct on grounds that wearing jacket
into courthouse that read "Fuck the Draft" was protected because "[tihe only
'conduct' which the State sought to punish [was] the fact of communication");
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (finding sit-in protesting
segregation in "whites only" area of library protected by First Amendment
because these rights not confined to verbal expression).
Lower federal courts have also found expressive conduct in a wide range of
activities. See, e.g., United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(holding that vigil by veteran protesting treatment by Veterans Administration
sufficiently expressive to implicate First Amendment); University of Utah
Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1204-05 (D. Utah
1986) (finding students' shanties to protest apartheid and school's investment
policies were "symbolic expression"); Crown Cent. Petroleum v. Waldman, 486
F. Supp. 759, 768 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that dealers closing gasoline
stations to express dissatisfaction with Department of Energy policies
constituted political speech); Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Morton,
379 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1974) (finding that Vietnam veterans engaged in
expressive conduct by establishing symbolic campsite at Capitol).
191 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
192 Id.
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the message will be understood by those who view it.193 In Spence,
the Court considered whether the actions of an anti-war protestor
constituted expressive conduct. The protestor hung an American
flag, with a peace-symbol pinned to the field of stars, upside down
from his apartment window to protest the 1970 Cambodia invasions
and the Kent State shootings. The Court found that the protestor's
conduct was intended to communicate a specific message, and that
message could be reasonably understood by others.1 9 4 In Texas v.
Johnson,95 the Court applied the Spence test to strike down a statute
that made it a crime to bum the United States flag, holding that
flag burning is expressive conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment.1 96 In addition, the Court found that the plaintiffs flag burn-
ing at the 1984 Republican Convention in Dallas was expressive and
overtly political, and thus "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to implicate the First Amendment."
1 97
The Second Circuit in Young commented that the beggars'
message to "exact money from those whom they accost" fell "far
outside the scope of protected speech under the First Amend-
ment."19 In applying the Spence test, the Young Court asserted that
begging was not inseparably intertwined with a particular message.
Rather, the court found that people beg to collect money.1 99 The
Young court also asserted that it was unlikely that subway passengers
who witness the conduct understand the particular message.2 °0
Thus, the Young Court found that begging failed the Spence test, and
would not enjoy First Amendment protection as expressive
conduct.
Once again, the Young decision is difficult to understand in light
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Tinker, Logan Valley, Spence and
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
196 Id. at 406. This 5-4 decision angered many Americans. "Fury over the
decision was widespread, and politicians strove to outdo each other in
patriotic chest thumping. The legal import of the decision, meanwhile,
seemed to be that the Court was scraping the butter of free-speech protection
over still more bread." Paul Reidinger, The Expressionists: When Is Conduct
Speech?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1990, at 90.
197 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
198 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Common sense tells us that begging is much more 'conduct' than it is
'speech.'"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
199 Id. at 153.
200 Id. at 153-54.
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Texas v. Johnson. Begging is inherently expressive and conveys an
objectively obvious political message. Beggars sitting in a public
place with tin cups at their feet convey the message that they and
others like them lack the basic necessities to survive. A beggar's
message is expressive and political, and thus "sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication to implicate the First Amend-
ment."20 1 The beggars' unspoken requests for assistance reminds
each person who passes by that people are homeless and live in
poverty. Each time beggars appeal for assistance, they act as living
reminders of the social problems of increasing homelessness and
poverty, and of the inability of the government to adequately care
for society's less fortunate members.2 °2
Furthermore, the beggars' message is more particular and more
readily understood by even an uninformed viewer than the mean-
ing behind the black armband in Tinker the peaceful picketing in
Logan Valley, the peace-symbol clad flag in Spence, or the flaming
flag in Texas v. Johnson.203 In Clark v. Community For Creative Non-
Violence, the Court assumed that the demonstrators sleeping in
Washington, D.C. parks to protest homelessness engaged in expres-
sive conduct.20 4 Justice Marshall's dissent in Clark, which describes
that ordinary citizens would likely understand the political message
intended by the sleeping demonstrators, applies just as eloquently
to disheveled beggars, sitting or sleeping in many of our nation's
cities.2 °5
201 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
202 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993)
(commenting that "the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person
holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys a
message of need for support and assistance").
203 See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405-06; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 410 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 505 (1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 509 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968).
204 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). However, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a National Park regulation forbidding the demonstrators
from camping in its parks because the regulation "narrowly focuses on the
Government's substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our
Capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of
people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence." Id. at 296.
205 Id. at 305-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall wrote that the public
would understand the protesters' message, because of "the remarkably apt fit
between the activity in which respondents seek to engage and the social
problem they seek to highlight. By using sleep as an integral part of their
mode of protest, respondents 'can express with their bodies the poignancy of
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In addition, whenever a passerby chooses to donate money to the
beggar, she shows that the beggars' message is understood by
others." 6 Also, the donation is expressive conduct on the part of
the passerby, because it conveys a message of concern for the beg-
gar's plight, understood both by the beggar and by any other
observer.2 °7 If a passerby tries to ignore the beggar by averting her
eyes and walking on, she is left with an indelible reminder of the
beggars' plight. As noted by the trial court in Young, the unsettling
appearance and message conveyed by the beggar gives the conduct
its expressive quality.20 The fact that this expression is objection-
able to others does not diminish its First Amendment protection.20 9
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that objectionable expression is
entitled to some First Amendment protection in Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tres.2 10 The Court held in Barnes that nude dancing, although
offensive to many people, contained expression protected by the
First Amendment. 21' The Court found that the First Amendment
protected "erotic dancing" despite the fact that the strippers' pay
was directly related to the number of drinks they induced their
their plight. They can physically demonstrate the neglect from which they
suffer with an articulateness even Dickens could not match.'" Id. (quoting
Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 601 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (Edwards,J., concurring)).
206 A beggar's expressive conduct can be understood by a passerby, even if
the individuals do not speak the same language. In one incident, an Indian
beggar, who was a polio victim, "used the universal language - empty fingers
raised to the lips to show hunger" to communicate with a tourist, who
understood the expressive gesture and gave the beggar a dollar bill. Vijay
Joshi, Tougher Times Loom For India's Beggars, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 11,
1992, at ElO.
207 If the beggar's message was not understood by other observers,
authorities could rarely show probable cause to arrest a homeless person for
violating an anti-begging ordinance. Authorities would not be able to
ascertain when the regulation was being violated.
208 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 358-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd & vacated, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 984 (1990).
209 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2559 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring) ("The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings,
offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected."); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (noting that "[t] he fact that society
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed,
if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason
for according it constitutional protection.").
210 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
211 Id. at 2460.
1994]
University of California, Davis
audience to purchase.212 However, the Court held that the protec-
tion was outweighed by public decency statutes designed to protect
morals and public order. 13 Thus, the Court upheld an Indiana law
that banned complete public nudity and required strip-teasers to
wear pasties and a G-string.214
It is almost beyond comprehension that the First Amendment
protects aspects of a nude dancer's erotic message, but not the
heartrending message of an impoverished beggar. It is difficult to
argue that the erotic message is more worthy of constitutional pro-
tection than individual solicitation on behalf of the homeless. The
logical result from the Court's decision seems to be that beggars
should dance, or strip, for their solicitations to be protected.215
Moreover, begging does not present the same risk of offending
public decency as presented by nude barroom dancers. Therefore,
in light of Barnes, begging should at least receive First Amendment
protection as an expressive activity.
4. Begging as not Within any of the Categorical Exceptions to
Protected Speech
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "freedom of
expression is made inviolate by the First Amendment, and, with
only rare and stringent exceptions, may not be suppressed .... ,2 16
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 In discussing the Barnes case, Stanford Law School Professor Gerald
Gunther commented: "I found it much more important that the court said
that a state assertion of an interest in public morality is enough to trump the
claim of free speech. That is scary. It tells us that what the majority says is
offensive is enough." Aaron Epstein, Court's Shift is Complete 6-3 or 5-4,
Moderates are Outvoted, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, June 30, 1991, at 4A. Professor
Gunther's concern also applies to begging. Beggars are offensive to many
people. Nevertheless, silencing beggars will not solve the problems of
homelessness and poverty.
215 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)
(holding that music protected by First Amendment); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 233 (1963) (granting First Amendment protection to
"boisterous," "loud," and "flamboyant" cheering and singing); Carew-Reid v.
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914, 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding
constitutionality of a ban on amplifiers on subway platforms but recognizing
that First Amendment protects music as expression); Goldstein v. Town of
Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D. Mass. 1979) (finding that street singer's
acceptance of contributions does not dilute First Amendment protection).
216 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76, 585 (1980)
(citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980)) (upholding regulation requiring
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The Court identified narrowly limited classes of speech that may be
prevented or punished without raising constitutional problems
almost fifty years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.217 The speech
classifications include lewd and obscene speech, profanity, libelous
and insulting speech and "'fighting words' - those that by their
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."21 The Court holds that these expressions are not within
military personnel to obtain approval from their commanders before
circulating petitions on Air Force bases, as protecting a substantial
government interest in maintaining military duty and discipline unrelated to
suppression of free speech).
217 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
218 Id. at 571-72; see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(affirming conviction of defendants for disseminating circulars to obstruct
recruiting and enlistment, noting that "[t he most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic"); GERALD GUNTHER, CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw 994 (12th ed.
1991) (noting that "bribery, perjury, and counseling to murder are widely
considered unprotected by the First Amendment"); cf. New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (upholding statutory ban on distribution of child
pornography because "the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs
the expressive interests" and "bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of
children engaged in its production . . . it is permissible to consider [child
pornography] as without the protection of the First Amendment"); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (finding that "[a]lthough these
[dirty] words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not
entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment").
Legal scholars have asserted that the Chaplinsky formulation has been
narrowed by a series of later decisions to reach only speech that tends "to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 929 (2nd ed. 1988) (indicating that Court's decision in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964), "inevitably called
into question the whole structure of First Amendment rights erected on the
Chaplinsky foundation, and ever since, that structure has been coming apart").
Indeed, since Chaplinsky, the Court has not upheld a single conviction for
uttering "fighting words."
Nonetheless, the Court has, either explicitly or implicitly, reaffirmed the
fighting words doctrine in every case subsequent to Chaplinsky. In 1971, in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971), the Court included both prongs
of the test in its formulation of the "fighting words" doctrine. The following
year, in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972), the Court explicitly
stated, "[o]ur decisions since Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state
power constitutionally to punish 'fighting' words under carefully drawn
statutes.. ." and "[wIe reaffirm that proposition today." The Court also cited
both prongs of Chaplinsky in overturning a regulation restricting speech in
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (holding that "[the
regulation] plainly has a broader sweep than the constitutional definition of
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the area of constitutionally protected speech,21 9 or that First
Amendment protection does not extend to them.220 Although
Court decisions have narrowed the scope of the traditional categori-
cal exceptions for defamation 221 and for obscenity,2 22 the Court's
opinion in R.A. V. made it clear that "a limited categorical approach
has remained an important part of our First Amendment
jurisprudence."22 -
Begging does not fit within any of these exceptions. The beggar's
plea for help does not defame anyone. Nor does a beggar's
'fighting words' announced in Chaplinsky... and reaffirmed in Gooding...
namely, 'those words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.'") (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
571-72).
It would seem that if the Court intended to eliminate a portion of the
Chaplinsky test, it would not continue to use words that it no longer considered
good law. Indeed, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988), the
Court reaffirmed the injury prong in Chaplinsky as one of the few exceptions
to speech not protected by the First Amendment. Finally, in RPA.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992), the Court refused petitioner's request to
modify the scope of the Chaplinsky formulation.
219 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483-85 (1957) (holding that
"obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"
and reviewing guarantees of freedom of expression in effect at time of
Constitution's ratification, concluding that "[i]n light of this history, it is
apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not
intended to protect every utterance"); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 266 (1952) (upholding Illinois' criminal libel law and finding that
"libelous utterances" not "within the area of constitutionally protected
speech"). But see RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (noting that any assertion that
category of expression is "not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech" must be "taken in context" and is not "literally true").
220 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 504
(1984) ("there are categories of communication and certain special utterances
to which the majestic protection of the First Amendment does not extend").
221 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (noting that
laws prohibiting "advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, ....
and the various other formulae for the repression of expression, [including
defamation] can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations").
222 RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring) (defining obscenity as
expression that "'appeal [s] to the prurient interest,.. .depict[s] or describe [s],
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, [and] taken as a whole, lack[s]
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value'") (quoting Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
223 Id. at 2543; see also Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1860 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Nothing . . . in this Court's precedents warrants
disregard of this longstanding tradition.").
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message fall within the obscenity category, because it does not
appeal to prurient interests, or depict or describe sexual conduct in
a patently offensive way, and does not lack serious political value.22 4
The beggar's request for money also does not constitute "fighting
words" because it does not tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace or inflict injury.225 Compared to "fighting words," beg-
gars' humble pleas for help express ideas about poverty and home-
lessness. Begging makes society aware that, even in America,
citizens are forced to seek handouts.
If begging does not fall within these narrowly limited classes of
unprotected speech, then the Court would have to find that per-
sonal solicitation constitutes a new category of unprotected speech
to uphold a ban on begging. This result seems very unlikely
because the Court strictly construes the existing categories of
unprotected speech.226 Justice Stevens has noted that, rather than
broadening the categories of unprotected speech, "the history of
the categorical approach is largely the history of narrowing the cat-
egories of unprotected speech."22 7 Thus, the Court will probably
not classify begging as an unprotected form of expression.
II. THE CONTEXTS OF BECGARS' ExPREssIvE AcrVITIES
A. Introduction
The preceding examination of begging's content and character
leads to the conclusion that begging is protected by the First
Amendment. However, that conclusion does not mean that a
homeless person is free to beg at will. A court determining the con-
224 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
225 Nor does the beggar's speech fall within the underlying reasons for
denying protection to "fighting words." The RA. Y Court explained that the
reason fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of the
First Amendment is not that "they constitute 'no part of the expression of
ideas' but only that they constitute 'no essential part of any exposition of
ideas.'" RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis in original)). "Fighting words [or other
unprotected speech] sometimes. .. are quite expressive indeed." Id. (citing
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
226 Id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring).
227 Id. Justice Stevens also commented that "[t ] his evolution ... indicates
that the categorical approach is unworkable and the quest for absolute
categories of 'protected' and 'unprotected' speech ultimately futile." Id.
Stevens predicted that the Court will eventually discard the approach, noting
that "[t]he quest for doctrinal certainty through the definition of categories
and subcategories is, in my opinion, destined to fail." Id. at 2566.
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stitutionality of begging must next consider the site of the begging
activities, or what Justice Stevens in R.A. V. referred to as the "con-
text" of First Amendment activities.228 The purpose of begging is to
obtain as much money as possible, so beggars try to solicit as many
people as possible. Therefore, beggars solicit at locations where the
public congregates, such as parks or fairs, or at sites where the pub-
lic must pass in transit, such as sidewalks, streets and other transpor-
tation nodes like airports, subway stations, bus terminals or train
depots. 229 Virtually all of these locations are public facilities. A
complete First Amendment analysis of this issue must determine in
what type of forum the beggar solicits, to establish the level of scru-
tiny that the anti-begging ordinance must meet to pass constitu-
tional muster.
Paradoxically, the Court seems to have maximized the right of a
beggar, or anyone, to speak, write, or engage in expressive conduct,
yet has minimized the public arenas where such activities may
occur. The Court has achieved this puzzling dichotomy by finding
that more and more public places are non-public fora. In a non-
public forum, the government is free to regulate protected speech
on a merely rational basis. If this trend continues, all the First
Amendment protections for begging come to naught, because beg-
gars would be unable to reach the public with their pleas for assist-
ance. This would not present a problem merely for beggars. The
same problem would be faced by any other group that expresses
views to the public in these fora, and that lack the money or the
political connections to gain access to more sophisticated media.
B. The Contexts of Beggars' Expressive Activities
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, the Court
described its forum-based approach to assessing governmental
restrictions placed on the use of its property. The Court articulated
a three-part analysis.23° If governmental property has traditionally
228 Id. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 479 (1988) (noting that Court's First Amendment analysis also considers
location to determine speaker's rights) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
778 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (the "question whether a specific act of
communication is protected by the First Amendment always requires some
consideration of both its content and its context").
229 See International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 2707 (1992) (describing historic speech activity at transporation nodes).
230 Id. at 2705-06 (citing Pery, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)).
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been available for public expression, speech regulations for these
fora receive the highest scrutiny. If government property is a desig-
nated public forum, speech regulations also receive the highest
scrutiny. If the property does not fall within these two categories,
speech regulation is subject to a more limited standard of review.
Here, the regulation need only be reasonable, and not based on
disagreement with the speaker's viewpoint.2"'
The Court originally established this forum analysis in Perry Edu-
cation Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n."2 ' The Perry Court defined
traditional public fora as places that have been devoted to assembly
or debate, whether by long tradition or by government fiat.233 The
Perry Court noted that streets and parks have been available
throughout history for assembling, communicating thoughts
234 otrbetween citizens, and discussing public questions. Justice Souter,
in his concurrence in Krishna, emphasized that a public street is
always considered a public forum. 235 Thus, if beggars' expressive
231 Id.
232 Perry, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). In United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720 (1990), the Court described the tripartite framework to determine how
First Amendment interests are analyzed with respect to government property:
Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has
been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as
public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny....
Regulation of speech on property that the Government has
expressly dedicated to speech activity is also examined under strict
scrutiny. . . . But regulation of speech activity where the
Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment
activity is examined only for reasonableness.
Id. at 726-27.
233 Periy, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
234 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850
(1992) (citing parks, streets, and sidewalks as examples of "quintessential
public forums"); Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (defining traditional
public forum as property that has as "a principal purpose . . . the free
exchange of ideas")); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267
(1988) (holding that high school newspaper was not public forum,
commenting that "public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets,
parks, and other traditional public forums"); Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968) ("streets,
sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated
with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the
purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly
and absolutely").
235 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2724 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a
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activities occur on a public street, or in a public park, governmental
regulation of protected speech must pass strict scrutiny, and would
be constitutional only if narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest.23 6
A designated or limited purpose public forum was defined in
Perry as public property that the state has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity. 2 7 In United States v.
Kokinda, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, mentioned university meet-
ing facilities and school board meetings as examples of state-cre-
ated semi-public fora.23 8 In Krishna, the Court made clear that the
government "does not create a public forum by inaction" or by per-
mitting members of the public "to visit a place owned or operated
by the government."23 9 Nor does public property become a public
forum "simply because members of the public are permitted to
come and go at will."240 Rather, the decision to create a public
forum must be made by "intentionally opening a nontraditional
forum for public discourse."241 To determine whether the govern-
ment intended to designate a forum as public, the Court looks to
the policy and practice of the government, as well as the property's
compatibility with expressive activity.24 2
specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust and are
properly considered traditional public fora.") (emphasis added) (quoting
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)); see also United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (discussing public fora).
236 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2563, 2566 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
237 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
238 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
239 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836
(1976)) (holding that military base was non-public forum despite fact that it
was continuously open to public, visited by 66,000 civilian and military vehicles
per day, and was crossed by ten paved roads and a public highway).
240 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (upholding distributing
leaflets and peaceful picketing with sign containing text of First Amendment
on public sidewalk as part of political protest)).
241 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. Both Krishna
and Kokinda quote Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (holding that government charity drive not designated
public forum because government's consistent policy had been to carefully
limit participants).
242 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
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The non-public forum was defined by Pery as public property
that "is not by tradition or by designation a forum for public com-
munication." 243 The Court in Krishna explained that the location
of property bears on whether a forum is public or non-public. Sep-
aration from acknowledged public areas, the Court noted, may
serve to indicate that the separated property is special, and subject
to greater restriction.244 Justice O'Connor, concurring in Krishna,
noted that "when government property is not dedicated to open
communication the government may - without further justifica-
tion - restrict use to those who participate in the forum's official
business. "245 Whether a site is a non-public forum has generally
been a straightforward inquiry, because the Court has been con-
fronted with cases that involve a discrete, single-purpose forum.
246
In Kokinda, for example, the Court considered a discrete, single-
purpose facility. The expressive activities in Kokinda took place on a
post office sidewalk that was the sole means customers could use to
243 Id. The Court found that the forum in Perry, a school mail system used
by faculty members, students, and one teachers' union, was non-public. Id. A
rival teachers' union sought access to the mail system in the course of
challenging the union in power. The Court found that the school district had
not created a designated public forum because the school principal
authorization to use the system had to be obtained from the school principal
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 47. The Court noted that there was no
suggestion that the general public had been permitted access to the system
and held that "[this type of selective access does not transform government
property into a public forum." Id.
244 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80).
245 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Perry, 460 U.S. at 53).
246 Id. at 2712 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806
(holding that Combined Federal Campaign charity drive not public forum);
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (stating that
Los Angeles' utility poles, used to post political candidates' campaign signs,
were not public fora because there was no "traditional right of access
respecting such items as utility poles for purposes of their communication");
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
128 (1982) (finding household mail boxes non-public fora because of "neither
historical nor constitutional support for the characterization of a letterbox as a
public forum"); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (finding that
county jail premises and non-public jail driveway, where 300 college students
demonstrated against classmate's arrest, were non-public fora because there
was "no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large groups of
the public been permitted to gather on this portion of the jail grounds for any
purpose").
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travel from the parking lot to the post office building.24 7 The side-
walk lay entirely on Postal Service property.248 A Postal Service reg-
ulation prohibited soliciting alms and contributions on postal
premises. The regulation expressly permitted political speech and
the distribution of literature soliciting support, including money
contributions, provided there was no in-person solicitation for
immediate payments. 2 9 The Democratic Party set up a table on
the sidewalk near the entrance to the post office to solicit immedi-
ate, in-person contributions, sell books and subscriptions and dis-
tribute literature. When the Democratic Party members refused to
leave, they were arrested and convicted of violating the regula-
tion. 250 The Court held that, as applied, the regulation did not vio-
late the First Amendment.251
In reaching its decision, the Court first determined that the side-
walk was not a traditional public forum.252 The Court looked at the
location and purpose of the property to determine whether it was a
public or non-public forum.253 The Court held that it was reason-
able for the Postal Service to prohibit solicitation because it has
determined that solicitation creates significant interference with
Congress' mandate to ensure effective and efficient distribution of
the mails. 254
The forum inquiry in Krishna, however, was not similarly straight-
forward, because the fora in that case were three multi-purpose air-
port terminals in the New York City area.255 In fact, only four
members of the Court256 joined with Chief Justice Rehnquist in
holding that these airports were non-public fora. In Krishna, the
Court determined that these airport terminals were non-public fora
because neither tradition nor purpose allow airport terminals to sat-
isfy the Pery standards for a public forum.257 The opinion noted
that airports have only recently achieved their contemporary size
247 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 723 (1990).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 738-39.
250 Id. at 723.
251 Id. at 723.
252 Id. at 727.
253 Id. at 728-29.
254 Id. at 732.
255 International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
2703 (1992). These airports included John F. Kennedy International Airport,
La Guardia Airport, and Newark International Airport. Id.
256 Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
257 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2708.
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and character, and thus have not been traditionally used for expres-
sive activity.25 Thus, airport terminals could not be considered
traditional public fora under Perry.
The Krishna Court also found that the government had not desig-
nated the airport terminals as public fora. It noted that only
recently have charitable and religious groups used airport terminals
as a forum for solicitation. "Thus, the tradition of airport activity
does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made
available for speech activity. "259 Moreover, airport operators' fre-
quent and continuing litigation to stop solicitation activities dem-
onstrates that airport terminals have not been intentionally opened
by their operators to solicitors.26
258 Id. at 2706.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 2706-07. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment upholding
the airports' authority to regulate solicitation; however, his analysis of the fora
issue differed in "substantial respects" from the majority's. Krishna, 112 S. Ct.
2711, 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Kennedy's view, the areas outside
the passenger security zones, such as the corridors and shopping areas,
constituted public fora. Id. In fact, Justice Kennedy opined that the Court's
finding that airport terminals were non-public fora "was flawed at its very
beginning." Id. at 2716. He felt that the proper "inquiry must be an objective
one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of the property." Id.
Justice Kennedy felt that his position was supported by the fact that, in the
Court's public-forum cases, the Justices "discuss and analyze these precise
characteristics." Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
727-29 (1990)).
Justice Kennedy felt that the proper analysis of whether a transportation
node was a public forum included the following:
The most important considerations in this analysis are whether the
property shares physical similarities with more traditional public
forums, whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in
broad public access to the property, and whether expressive
activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the uses to
which the government has as a factual matter dedicated the
property. . . . The possibility of some theoretical inconsistency
between expressive activities and the property's uses should not
bar a finding of a public forum, if those inconsistencies can be
avoided through simple and permitted regulations.
Id. at 2718.
Applying this analysis, Justice Kennedy felt that the public areas in airports
where the Krishnas solicited were public fora because they were "open to the
public without restriction." Id. at 2719. Justice Kennedy also opined that it
was "apparent from the record, and from the recent history of airports, that
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In determining that the airports in Krishna constituted non-pub-
lic fora, the Court explicitly left open the issue of what other trans-
portation nodes (or perhaps, other airports) 261  would be
considered non-public fora.262 The Court noted that each facility
required separate examination to determine whether transporta-
tion necessities are compatible with the expressive activity at
issue.
2 6 3
Many crucial differences distinguish the airports in Krishna from
the transportation nodes most frequently used by beggars for their
expressive activities. Unlike airports, where solicitation by charities
and religious groups has only recently become common practice,
other transportation nodes have been subject to charitable solicita-
tion for a long time. In fact, many religious organizations specifi-
cally target travelers waiting in bus or train stations for their
solicitation and recruitment activities.
Furthermore, most anti-begging ordinances permit use of public
facilities for solicitation by organized charities. 265 Thus, the govern-
ment makes these transportation nodes available for the activity
that the beggar wishes to pursue by approving solicitations for char-
itable causes. Through this authorization, the government has tac-
when adequate time, place, and manner regulations are in place, expressive
activity is quite compatible with the uses of major airports." Id.; see also id. at
2724-25 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that
the airports' public areas in Krishna qualify as public fora).
261 In Krishna, Justice Souter made clear that he would not automatically
find all airports to be non-public fora. "But to find one example of a certain
property type (e.g., airports, post offices, etc.) that is not a public forum is not
to rule out all properties of that sort. One can imagine a public airport of a
size or design or need for extraordinary security that would render expressive
activity incompatible with its normal use." Id. at 2724 (citation omitted).
262 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2707 ("To blithely equate airports with other
transportation centers, therefore, would be a mistake.").
263 Id. For example, airports have greater security requirements than other
transportation nodes, and limit public access to particular areas. Id. (citing 14
C.F.R. § 107.11 (f) (1991) and UNrrED STATES DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION NEWS
RELEASE, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, January 18, 1991
(reporting that for four month period the Federal Aviation Administration
required airports to limit access to areas normally open to public)).
264 See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 129-31 (1988) (upholding cause of action for
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress when plaintiffs,
contacted by Unification Church at bus stations, were induced by
misrepresentation into entering coercive atmosphere that led them to join
Church), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
265 See 21 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 1050.6(c) (1983).
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itly acknowledged that parts of the facility are appropriate fora for
this activity. If the government has expressly dedicated the prop-
erty for public discourse by allowing solicitation by licensed and
registered charitable organizations, it has created a designated pub-
lic forum under Pery.2" Under the Court's forum analysis, the gov-
ernment cannot "permit organized charities, but not beggars, to
rattle a cup full of change as one passes by."26 7 Moreover, unlike
the frequent litigation brought by airport operators that indicates
airport terminals have not been intentionally opened for solicita-
tion as public fora, very few cases have challenged group solicitation
in other transportation nodes. Only Young and Wolin, both from
the Second Circuit, have considered this issue at the federal appel-
late level. In Young, the court stated that New York's subway system
was a non-public forum. In contrast, the Wolin court found that the
New York bus terminal was a public forum.26 Cases challenging
solicitation in airports, however, have reached the courts of the
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits, and
these courts have found that airports in Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth,
266 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
267 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 168 (2d Cir. 1990)
(Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
984 (1990).
In upholding the right of anti-war demonstrators to conduct speech
activities in New York Port Authority's Bus Terminal, the Second Circuit noted
in Wolin v. Port of NewYork Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968), that the Authority's admission of charity solicitors shows "the
ease with which the Terminal accommodates different forms of
communication. To deny access to political communication seems an
anomalous inversion of our fundamental values." Id. at 90. The court noted
that "[t]he Terminal building is an appropriate place for expressing one's
views precisely because the primary activity for which it is designed is attended
with noisy crowds and vehicles, some unrest and less than perfect order." Id.
268 In Young, the court noted that the Transit Authority "never intended to
designate sections of the subway system . . . as a place for begging and
panhandling." Young, 903 F.2d at 162. In Wolin, the court described the bus
terminal as "one of the busiest passageways in the country" and "something of
a small city - but built indoors, with its 'streets' in effect set atop one another,
and vehicles operating under, above, and to the side, not unlike some
futuristic design for urban living." Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89-90; see also Carew-Reid
v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914, 919 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding
that amplifier ban is reasonable time, place, or manner regulation and,
therefore, did not "address the question whether the subway platforms
constitute traditional, designated, or limited public forums").
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Los Angeles, St. Louis and Washington, D.C., constitute public
fora. 26
9
Despite these distinctions between the airport terminals in
Krishna and other transportation nodes frequently used by beggars,
the forum analysis of the majority of the Court in Kokinda and the
"categorical approach" of the plurality in Krishna have the potential
to greatly expand the number and type of facilities classified as non-
public fora.2 7 ° This expansion would substantially limit the loca-
tions where beggars can solicit. Although the Krishna Court reaf-
269 SeeJamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that public concourse of St. Louis Airport was public forum because
the "character, pattern of activity, and nature of purpose . . . make it an
appropriate place for the communication of views"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987
(1988);Jews forJesus v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that Central Terminal Area of Los Angeles International
Airport is traditional public forum and noting that "[e]very circuit which has
confronted the issue has reached the same conclusion"), affd on other grounds,
482 U.S. 569 (1987); United States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade &
Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding
that District of Columbia's two airports constituted public fora, commenting
that "[w] hatever commonsense [sic] differences may exist in the forms of free
speech allowable in airports, as opposed to parks and streets, an unusual
consensus ofjudicial, legislative, and administrative opinion would classify the
public areas of National and Dulles squarely within the public forum family");
Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that Dallas-
Fort Worth terminal buildings were public fora, noting that "[i]t is now
generally well established that airport terminals.., are public forums in which
efforts to regulate speech or religious activity must comport with First
Amendment guarantees"), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982); Chicago Area
Military Project v. Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that
terminal buildings of Chicago's O'Hare Airport should be considered public
fora since "perhaps 90,000 transients" per day "are freely admitted to the
public areas... not only in connection with air travel, but also for shopping,
dining, sightseeing, or merely to satisfy their curiosity"), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975).
270 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter, concurring in
Krishna, showed serious misgivings about the Court's categorical approach to
public forum analysis. International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
112 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (1992). Justice Kennedy felt that the Court's categorical
approach was "contrary to the underlying purposes of the public forum
doctrine" which were to ensure freedom of expression. He explained that a
"fundamental tenet of our Constitution is that the government is subject to
constraints which private persons are not. The [public forum] doctrine
vindicates that principle by recognizing limits on the government's control
over speech activities on property suitable for free expression." Id. at 2717.
"[U] nder the proper circumstances,"Justice Kennedy indicated that he "would
accord public forum status to other forms of property, regardless of its ancient
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firmed that parks and streets are regarded as traditional public
fora,271 these sites are becoming increasingly inopportune locations
for beggars to reach many people. Parks are frequently the scene
of criminal activities, leading to a marked decrease in the use of the
parks by the public. Public streets are also of little use to beggars
confronted with heavy, fast-moving traffic.272 The traditional small-
town scene of American citizens strolling down picturesque streets
no longer exists in modem urban society. Many people use side-
walks today only to get from their cars to their destination and back
again. Thus, public sidewalks, before considered public fora, are
or contemporary origins and whether or not it fits within a narrow historic
tradition." Id. at 2718.
Justice Souter agreed with Justice Kennedy's criticisms of the Court's
categorical approach. He explained his viewpoint regarding the proper
analysis as follows:
The designation of a given piece of public property as a traditional
public forum must not merely state a conclusion that the property
falls within a static category including streets, parks, sidewalks and
perhaps not much more, but must represent a conclusion that the
property is no different in principle from such examples, which we
have previously described as "archetypes" of property from which
the government was and is powerless to exclude speech.... [T] he
enquiry may and must relate to the particular property at issue and
not necessarily to the "precise classification of the property."
Id. at 2724 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988)).
271 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706; Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that government property of a type
which by history and tradition has been available for speech activity must
continue to be recognized as a public forum.").
272 Justice Kennedy recognized that the Court's categorical approach in
Krishna would lead to a decrease in the opportunity for solicitation and other
expressive activities. "[0]ur failure to recognize the possibility that new types
of government property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a
serious curtailment of our expressive activity." Id. at 2717 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). He elaborated: "We have allowed flexibility in our doctrine to
meet changing technologies in other areas of constitutional interpretation
and I believe we must do the same with the First Amendment." Id. at 2718
(citation omitted).
Justice Souter recognized this social transformation when he commented
that treating public fora as "closed by their description as 'traditional' . . . has
no warrant in a Constitution whose values are not to be left behind in the city
streets that are no longer the only focus of our community life." Id. at 2724
(SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "If that were the line of
[the Court's] direction, we might as well abandon the public forum doctrine
altogether." Id.
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now subject to reclassification, based on Kokinda, as non-public
fora.271 This reclassification provides beggars with little opportu-
nity to solicit monetary assistance, and allows a compassion-fatigued
judiciary to find a modern-day sidewalk more like a non-public sin-
gle purpose walkway in Kokinda, than the traditional public side-
walks in the Court's previous cases.2 74
If the Court determines that a facility is a non-public forum, then
the beggars' speech may be regulated far more rigorously than in
either a traditional or a designated public forum. The Court noted
in both Krishna and Kokinda that the Government's decision to
restrict access to a non-public forum need only be reasonable - it
need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limita-
tion.27' Given the Court's expansive definition of "reasonable," it
seems doubtful that an anti-begging ordinance restricting speech in
a non-public forum would be overturned on the grounds that the
government lacked a reasonable basis for the regulation.
276
273 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 730 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985); Krishna 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708 (quoting Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 808). In Cornelius, the Court noted that "control over access to a non-
public forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as
the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)). In
applying this standard, the Court found that the President "could reasonably
conclude" that excluding advocacy groups from access to federal workplaces
during the Combined Federal Campaign would prevent campaign disruption.
Id. at 809-11.
276 Justice O'Connor, concurring in Krishna, gave some slight hope that
even under the relaxed "reasonable basis" test, a blanket ban on begging
might not be constitutional. She argued that, if airports (or transportation
nodes) are not public fora, this "does not mean that the government can
restrict speech in whatever way it likes. The Government, even when acting in
its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First
Amendment constraints." Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2712-13 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725). She explained that the
"reasonableness inquiry . . . is not whether the restrictions on speech are
'consistent with... preserving the property' for air travel ... but whether they
are reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the
Port Authority has deliberately created." Id. at 2713 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
50-51).
Moreover, the Court might find an anti-begging ordinance unconstitutional
based on the second prong of the reasonableness test - that the statute was
"an effort to suppress the [beggars'] expressive activities due to disagreement
with their views." See infra notes 284-339 and accompanying text (regarding
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Such Court deference to the government's regulation of begging
would leave the government with "almost unlimited authority to
restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articu-
lating a non-speech-related purpose for the area." This approach
would leave almost no room to develop new public fora absent the
government's approval. 7 Therefore, the government would
become the sole arbiter of speech curtailment, "unconstrained by
an independent duty to respect the speech its citizens can voice
there."27 This exclusive power "allows the government to tilt the
dialogue heard by the public, to exclude more marginal voices,"
including beggars. 7 9
Homeless beggars provide a compelling example of the marginal
voices the public forum doctrine should protect. Beggars have no
access to more sophisticated media apart from the rare newspaper
interview. Their only opportunity to gather and speak with others
who may help them occurs in public places where people congre-
gate. Consequently, beggars must seek out other public areas, like
transportation nodes, to voice their pleas for financial assistance.
whether anti-begging ordinances are viewpoint-based or viewpoint-
discriminatory).
277 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy pointed out that under the majority's view "the authority of the
government to control speech on its property is paramount, for in almost all
cases the critical step in the Court's analysis is a classification of the property
that turns on the government's own definition or decision." Id.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 2720 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In fact, Justice Kennedy
explained that "[o]ne of the primary purposes of the public forum is to
provide persons who lack access to more sophisticated media the opportunity
to speak." Id. at 2723. "Public places are of necessity the locus for discussion
of public issues .... At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle that in
a free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with other
persons in public places." Id. at 2716-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "The
liberties protected by [the forum] doctrine derive from the Assembly, as well as
the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, and are essential to a
functioning democracy." Id. at 2116. "The right of speech protected by the
[public forum] doctrine... comes not from a Supreme Court dictum but from
the constitutional recognition that the government cannot impose silence on
a free people." Id. at 2717.
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III. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ANTI-BEGGING ORDINANCES
A. The Nature of Anti-Begging Ordinances
1. Introduction
The nature and scope of anti-begging ordinances must be
examined in order to determine whether the regulations are consti-
tutionally permissible.28 ° The nature of anti-begging ordinances
determines whether the regulations impermissibly restrict the con-
tent of the speech or the viewpoint of the speaker. At a minimum,
the homeless can probably successfully challenge the nature of anti-
begging ordinances, such as the regulation in the Young case, which
ban begging by individuals for themselves while permitting such
solicitation by individuals for charitable groups. 281 These regula-
tions prohibit speech on the basis of both the speech content and
the speaker's viewpoint. Challenging the nature of such anti-beg-
ging ordinances seems to offer the best avenue for beggars, and
other disfavored speakers, to surmount the potential hurdles
imposed by the Court's increasingly restrictive public forum doc-
trine. If the Court finds that the contexts of the beggars' expressive
activities constitute non-public fora and the government's ordi-
nance has a reasonable basis, the regulation still fails under the
First Amendment if it is viewpoint-based.282 Similarly, if the Court
finds that begging occurs in public fora, an anti-begging ordinance
would not be a constitutional time, place and manner regulation if
found content-based or viewpoint-based. 2 3 Even if the beggars'
expressive activities are not protected by the First Amendment, an
280 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2568-69 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
281 See 21 N.Y.C.C.R.R § 1050.6(c) (1983); see, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2905(A)(3) (West 1991) (prohibiting begging "unless specifically
authorized by law"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:107(3) (West 1992) (providing
that prohibition against begging or soliciting alms "shall not apply to persons
soliciting alms for bona fide religious, charitable or eleemosynary
organizations with the authorization thereof"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(6)
(McKinney 1991) (prohibiting loitering or remaining in any transportation
facility for purpose of soliciting "unless specifically authorized to do so").
282 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-06.
283 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The Court in RA.V stressed the importance of this
threshold inquiry: the Court has "upheld reasonable 'time, place, or manner'
restrictions, but only if they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.'" Id. (emphasis added).
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anti-begging ordinance would be constitutional only if it does not
restrict the speech based on its content.
2. Anti-Begging Ordinances as Content-Based and Viewpoint-
Based Regulations of Protected Speech
Assuming that begging constitutes expression protected by the
First Amendment, the Court's scrutiny initially considers whether
the statute distinguished between prohibited and permitted speech
by its content.28 4 An ordinance is content-based if it is directed at a
person's point of view or if it is directed at the subject matter of the
communication. 28 5 As the Court noted in R.A.V, content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid. 216 If an anti-begging ordi-
nance is found to be content-based, the government must show that
the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.28 1
284 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
285 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543-44 n.4 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980), as noting that "the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content").
286 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542. In determining whether an ordinance is
content-based or content-neutral, the Court inquires whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message
it conveys. Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral so
long as it is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
287 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (finding unconstitutional
statute barring critical displays within 500 feet of foreign embassy because
regulation focused on shielding diplomats from criticism and was not justified
by state interests in avoiding visual clutter and protecting embassy security); see
infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text (discussing Court's repeated failure
to find compelling governmental interest in preventing non-captive audience
from offensive speech or conduct).
In other contexts, the Court has found that a variety of asserted
governmental interests did not satisfy the stringent test of strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Eichman v. United States, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (protecting "physical
integrity" of the flag not a state interest that satisfies strict scrutiny); Sable
Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (finding that FCC's
ban on non-obscene, indecent dial-a-porn messages violated First Amendment
because adult access ban far exceeds "the compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well-being of minors"); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 417 (1989) (promoting respect for flag not sufficient to satisfy strict
scrutiny); FEC v. National Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498
(1985) (invalidating statute imposing criminal sanctions on political
committee spending over $1000 on candidate because state's interest supports
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Most anti-begging ordinances are content-based speech restric-
tions because they permit beggars to speak as vehemently as they
wish, as long as they abstain from including a casual plea for finan-
cial assistance. Thus, a violation hinges entirely on what beggars
say. Because anti-begging ordinances regulate speech on the basis
of the message conveyed, these statutes are content-based.
Furthermore, as the district court noted in Loper, these regula-
tions allow the organized charity to solicit on the street while
preventing the unorganized beggar from doing so. 211 Thus, anti-
begging ordinances are "directed at the content of... expression
.. .. "289 The court explained that such regulations are content-
based because they treat side-by-side solicitors differently. If the
solicitor is an organized charity, the solicitation is permitted. If the
solicitor is a beggar, the solicitation is criminal.29 ' Thus, under
most anti-begging ordinances, if a beggar is a member of a charita-
ble organization, such as a church, the beggar could solicit the
same money on behalf of her church without violating most anti-
begging ordinances. 29' In effect, the ordinances allow a solicitor
for a recognized charity to say "give my charity money," but they
forbid a beggar to say "give me money." As the Court made clear in
R.A. V., the government may not regulate speech based on hostility
regulating only large aggregations of wealth); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-
59 (1976) (finding that governmental interest in safeguarding integrity of
electoral process not sufficiently compelling to uphold federal statute placing
ceilings on campaign expenditures and candidate's personal expenditures);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (finding Virginia's interest in
insuring high professional standards not sufficiently compelling to justify
preventing pro bono civil rights attorneys from soliciting litigation).
On the other hand, the Court has found the strict scrutiny standard satisfied
by sufficient governmental interests in other cases. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (finding compelling state interest
banning corporate contributions); Board of Directors v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S.
537, 549 (1987) (finding that California's Unruh Act could require Rotary
Clubs to admit women, because abridging group's associational rights was
justified by state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women).
288 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1047 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), afftd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 1040; see also Loper, 999 F.2d at 704 ("We see little difference
between those who solicit for organized charities and those who solicit for
themselves in regard to the message conveyed.").
291 The beggar could either keep the money for his or her personal needs
(with the church's approval) or turn the donations over to the church, which
could then return all or a part of the contributions to the beggar.
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or favoritism toward the underlying message.292 Thus, the govern-
ment could not prohibit individual solicitation because of hostility
to the beggar's message, nor could the government permit individ-
ual solicitation for an organized charity because it favored the char-
itable cause.
The Second Circuit in Young found the New York Transit Author-
ity's anti-begging ordinance content-neutral because the ordinance
did not regulate begging based on disagreement with the message
conveyed. Rather, the court stated that the ordinance served legiti-
mate governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of any
message. 93 In his concurrence in Krishna, Justice Kennedy noted
that the solicitation regulation in Krishna was also a content-neutral
rule that served a significant governmental interest.294 However,
crucial differences distinguish the anti-begging ordinance in Young
from the solicitation regulation in Krishna. Rather than restricting
all individual solicitation, like the anti-begging ordinance in Young,
the Port Authority's regulation in Krishna prohibited only solicita-
tion containing continuous or repetitive fraud and duress.295 Jus-
tice Kennedy concluded that, because the regulation was directed
at fraud and duress and not at a particular message, idea, or form of
speech, the regulation was content-neutral. 29 6 Justice Kennedy
made it clear, however, that if the regulation prohibited all speech
requesting contributions, he would instead conclude that the regu-
292 RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992).
293 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). In reaching this decision, the Young court
noted:
Quite apart from any particularized idea or message it might
arguably possess, begging poses significant dangers to the subway
system. The conduct threatens passenger well-being and safety as
well as disrupts the system's smooth operation. These dangers,
independent of the alleged communicative character of begging,
give rise to the regulation. Even if begging had no communicative
character at all, these independent dangers would be just as real,
and consequently, there would remain a substantial governmental
interest in prohibiting the conduct in the subway.
Id.
294 International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711,
2722 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
295 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704.
296 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It was thus
"apparent" to Justice Kennedy that the "justification for the solicitation ban
[was] unrelated to the content of speech or the identity of the speaker." Id.
19941
University of Calfornia, Davis
lation was "a direct, content-based restriction of speech in clear vio-
lation of the First Amendment."
297
In contrast to the solicitation ban in Krishna, most anti-begging
ordinances, like the New York Transit Authority's regulation in
Young, prohibit all personal solicitations by individuals. In Burson v.
Freeman, the Court held that content-based regulations include
prohibitions against public discussion of an entire topic. 298 The
Court explained in RA. V that content discrimination may indicate
that the government can drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace. 299 This governmental ability is apparent in the case of
the homeless, who are perhaps less able than any other cognizable
group to voice their perspective and are thus most vulnerable to
having their ideas and viewpoints driven from the marketplace.
Thus, anti-begging ordinances that prohibit all personal contribu-
tion requests would appear to constitute direct, content-based
restrictions in violation of the First Amendment.30
0
297 Id. at 2721 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Loper v. New York City
Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding statute "not content
neutral because it prohibited all speech related to begging").
298 Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850 (1992) (citing Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)); see also Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 512 (1991)
(striking down New York's "Son of Sam" law requiring that income from works
describing crime of accused or convicted criminal be deposited in escrow
account because content-based statute "has singled out speech on a particular
subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other
income"); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516-17
(1993) (finding that Cincinnati statute banning newsracks containing
"commercial handbills" while permitting newsracks containing newspapers
was "by any commonsense understanding of the term . . . content-based"
because "sweeping ban... bars from [Cincinnati's] sidewalks a whole class of
constitutionally protected speech").
299 RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992); see also Leathers v.
Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991) (upholding Arkansas statute imposing
sales tax on cable television services, but not print media, because tax did not
"distort the market for ideas" by targeting only "a small number of speakers");
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (noting that
content-based regulation "denies one group of persons the right to address a
selected audience on 'controversial issues of public policy'" and may reflect
"an impermissible attempt 'to allow a government [to] control... the search
for political truth'") (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public S Erv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980)); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (noting that government "may not select which issues are
worth discussing or debating in public facilities").
300 See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1801 (1993) (noting that
"proposition" that "flat ban on commercial solicitation could be regarded as a
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Moreover, unlike the solicitation regulation in Krishna, most anti-
begging ordinances are also viewpoint-based because they regulate
speech based on the speaker's identity. When considering content-
based regulations, the Court has distinguished between subject mat-
ter restrictions on expression and viewpoint restrictions, and has
indicated that the latter are particularly pernicious.01 Justices have
described viewpoint discrimination as "censorship in its purest
form,"502 and have indicated that regulations restricting a speaker's
viewpoint require "particular scrutiny, in part because such regula-
tion often indicates a legislative effort to skew public debate on an
issue." 3 ' In such a case, the First Amendment is "plainly
offended."" 4
Many members of the public probably disagree with the view-
point of beggars. In the minds of the compassion-fatigued public,
the viewpoint of the homeless is that they should receive a handout.
The public is increasingly hostile to the homeless, and is less willing
to provide assistance, to listen to pleas for help, or to see homeless
individuals begging in public areas. The testimony at the public
hearings in the Young case left little doubt that many New Yorkers
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on speech" was "open to
serious doubt"); Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(finding that California Penal Code § 647(c) prohibiting begging "in any
public place or in any place open to the public" was content-based).
301 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring); Mosley, 408 U.S. at
96.
302 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
303 R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (overturning as prior restraint statute
prohibiting wearing American military uniform in theatrical production if
portrayal discredits armed forces)). Scrutiny is at its highest where "the
legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people."
Id. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978)); see also Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313 (1984) (describing the "general prohibition
against content-based regulations" as "an essential tool of First Amendment
analysis" because "it helps to put into operation the well-established principle
that 'government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views'") (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 (1972)).
304 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 785-86).
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wanted to rid their city of its homeless citizens.30° One way for leg-
islators to respond to their compassion-fatigued constituents is to
pass a viewpoint-based ordinance forbidding homeless individuals
from begging. This ordinance would fail under a First Amendment
challenge because it appears to be a legislative attempt to skew pub-
lic debate on an issue by prohibiting beggars from expressing their
views to others.30 6
Moreover, a content-based anti-begging ordinance may be chal-
lenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In City of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court
held unconstitutional a statute exempting labor picketing from a
ban on peaceful picketing because the statute's discrimination
among pickets was based on the protest's content.30 7 The Court
analyzed the discriminatory terms in the ordinance under the
Equal Protection Clause. 308 Because the government must allow all
points of view equal opportunity to be heard, the Court recognized
that First Amendment principles may be relevant to an equal pro-
tection claim challenging distinctions that affect protected expres-
sion.3" The Court reaffirmed in Burson that content-based
restrictions raise Fourteenth Amendment equal protection con-
cerns, and a "content-based regulation of speech in a public forum
is valid only if it can survive strict scrutiny. "310
305 See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.
1990) (discussing study initiated in 1988 by New York Transit Authority,
concerning "quality of life problems" experienced by subway riders), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
306 Unlike the St. Paul regulation in R.A. V., anti-begging ordinances do not
select for prohibition only "those . . . words that communicate ideas in a
threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, [they]
proscribe[ ] . . . words of whatever manner that [constitute begging]." See
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. As the R.A.V. Court noted: "Selectivity of this sort
creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of
particular ideas." Id.; see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736
(1990) (finding that "[n]othing" in Postal Service's regulation suggested an
intention "to discourage one viewpoint and advance another.... By excluding
all.. . groups from engaging in [solicitation] the Postal Service is not granting
to 'one side of a debatable public question.., a monopoly in expressing its
views.'") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
307 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102.
308 Id. at 94-95 (recognizing that equal protection claim closely intertwined
with First Amendment interests).
309 Id. at 96.
310 Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850-51 n.3 (1992); see also Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143
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Under strict scrutiny, the public's reported disdain and hostility
toward beggars and their viewpoints fails to justify a content-based
anti-begging ordinance under either a free speech or an equal pro-
tection analysis. 11 As the Court noted in Burson, "we have long rec-
ognized that 'the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it.'" 12 The Court has also made it
(1966); Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting
Carey, 447 U.S. at 460); Parr v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. 3d 861 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). In Parr, the California Supreme Court invalidated
an ordinance prohibiting sitting and lying on public land, enacted to curtail
an influx of hippies into Carmel. The court found the ordinance
unconstitutional because it discriminated against "an ill-defined social caste
whose members are deemed social pariahs by the city fathers." Id. at 870.
311 For example, applying strict scrutiny to a content-based regulation in a
free speech context in Texas v. Johnson, the Court struck down a Texas statute
that rendered desecration of the flag unlawful. Noting that the statute was
directly "aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the ideas
expressed by the prohibited activity," the Court commented: "If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411, 414
(1989). Similarly, in Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973),
the Court invalidated a content-based regulation in an equal protection
context. In Moreno, Congress had reacted to public hostility toward "hippies
and hippie communes" by enacting the Food Stamp Act of 1971, which
excluded welfare recipients living with unrelated individuals from receiving
food stamps. Id. at 534. In overturning the statute, the Court noted that "if
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest." Id. The Court found that "unrelated persons" did not
rationally further the governmental interest in "the prevention of fraud" and,
instead, created an "irrational classification in violation of the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Id. at 537-38.
312 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 55 (1988) (requiring nationally known minister to prove actual malice to
recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress from cartoon
parody, because outrageousness standard "runs afoul of [the Court's]
longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience")); see also
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (reversing defendant's
conviction for burning American flag during political protest in violation of
Flag Protection Act of 1989, noting that although "desecration of the flag is
deeply offensive to many.... [p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the
very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering");
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) ("much that we
encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities...
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clear that mere public intolerance or animosity can never form the
basis to limit constitutional freedoms.3 13
The Court has also held in numerous cases that the governmen-
tal interest in protecting non-captive audiences from offense, such
as those who pass by a beggar, are not sufficiently compelling to
satisfy strict scrutiny. For example, in Cohen v. California, the Court
held that the government's interest in protecting an audience from
exposure to profanity was not compelling because offended onlook-
ers could simply avert their eyes. 14 Applying this rationale, the
Court in Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonvie struck down a ban on show-
ing films containing nudity at a drive-in theater visible from a pub-
lic street. Neither the government's asserted interest in protecting
traffic safety nor the viewer's privacy rights were found sufficient to
satisfy strict scrutiny."' In reaching this conclusion, the Court
added that the statute failed to ban other scenes equally likely to
distract drivers and that a drive-in theater screen was not so obtru-
the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer"); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579, 592
(1969) (noting that "[iut is firmly settled that under our Constitution the
public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (invalidating ordinance requiring religious solicitors to
pay license tax as violating First Amendment, noting that "a community may
not suppress . . . the dissemination of views because they are unpopular,
annoying or distasteful").
313 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) ("[The] First
and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to criminalize exercise of
right of assembly simply because its exercise may be 'annoying' to some
people."); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (noting that speech
'may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging [and] may . . . have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.").
314 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). The Court explained that
the government's ability to shut off speech depended on "a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner." Id. Commenting on the rationale behind its decision in Cohen,
the Court in Enznoznih v. City ofJacksonvie noted that "the Constitution does
not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech
are sufficiently so offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer .... [T]he burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further
bombardment of [her] sensibilities simply by averting [her] eyes.'" 422 U.S.
205, 210-11 (1975) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21).
315 Enznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212, 215.
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316sive that an unwilling individual could not avoid exposure. The
Court held that the limited privacy interests people possess on the
public streets could not justify censorship of otherwise protected
speech based on its content.3 17
The rationale behind the Cohen and Erznoznik decisions would
apply to a passerby approached by a begger on the public streets, in
a park, or in a subway station. In rejecting an argument that solici-
tation by a beggar violates a citizen's right to privacy, the district
court in Loper described the many options available to a non-captive
solicitee. The court noted that the person can turn away, shake her
head before the expression is uttered, avert her eyes and refuse to
acknowledge the speaker, or listen to the message and then decide
how to respond to the speaker's personal appeal.31 8 Beggars are
not so obtrusive that an unwilling individual cannot avoid their
solicitation. Moreover, it is clear that the alternative view would
allow a compassion-fatigued public to silence beggars simply to
serve their personal predilections.
3. Anti-Begging Ordinances as Content-Discriminatory and
Viewpoint-Discriminatory Regulations of Unprotected
Speech
Even if the Young decision's implication is correct that begging
constitutes unprotected speech, the Court in RA.V. established a
limit upon the government's ability to prohibit proscribable speech
based on the speech's content.3 19 The Court noted that while
316 Id. at 212-13.
317 Id.; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1988) (finding that
protecting privacy at home not enough to justify content-based regulation
criminalizing all picketing, except labor picketing, near schools and
residences); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
541-42 (1980) (striking down ban on billing inserts containing controversial
policy discussions because First Amendment prevents government from
prohibiting speech as intrusive unless captive audience cannot avoid it).
The Court has, however, stressed the importance of protecting captive
audiences from offensive communications, especially in their own homes. See,
e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (noting that unwilling listeners
may be protected within their own homes); Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 ("The State's
interest in protecting the well being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.").
318 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1045 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
319 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992). The Court
pointed out that none of their previous cases "even involved, much less
considered and resolved, the issue of content discrimination through
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unprotected speech can be regulated under the First Amendment,
these categories of speech are not entirely invisible to the Constitu-
tion.32° Government may not enact content discrimination for rea-
sons unrelated to the message's distinctively proscribable
content.321 Thus, even if personal solicitation by a beggar somehow
falls within a category of unprotected speech, government may not
proscribe only certain types of begging, such as begging by individ-
uals for themselves, while permitting other types of begging, such as
begging by individuals for a charity, based on content.3 22
In explaining the limits on content-based regulation of proscrib-
able speech, the Court gave several examples of permissible and
impermissible regulations. First, the Court noted that the state can
ban expressive activity for the activity it contains, but not for the
ideas it expresses. For instance, burning a flag in violation of an
ordinance against outdoor fires is punishable, but not burning a
flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag.32
regulation of 'unprotected speech....' Id. at n.5. The Court further found
that "the prohibition against content discrimination .... applies differently in
the context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech."
Id. at 2545. The RA. V. Court explained:
[T] he exclusion of "fighting words" [or begging] from the scope of
the First Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that
Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are, despite
their verbal character, essentially a "nonspeech" element of
communication. Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy
sound truck: Each is... a "mode of speech"...; both can be used
to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon
the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also
with fighting words [or begging]: The government may not
regulate use based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the
underlying message expressed.
Id. (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951)).
320 Id. at 2543.
321 Id.
322 The Court in RA. V. made this distinction clear when it stated that "our
cases surely do not establish the proposition that the First Amendment
imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such
proscribable expression, so that the government 'may regulate [them] freely.'"
Id. (quoting RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J. concurring)) (alteration in
original). As the Court noted, "[t]hat would mean that a city council could
enact an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain
criticism of the city government or, indeed, that do not include endorsement
of the city government. Such a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to
First Amendment protection is at odds with common sense and with our
jurisprudence as well." Id.
323 Id. at 2544 (citing Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989)).
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Thus, begging in violation of an ordinance against standing too
close to the edge of the subway platform might be punishable, but
not begging in violation of an ordinance against individual solicita-
tion. Second, the Court explained that the government's power to
prohibit speech based on one unprotected content element (e.g.,
obscenity) does not provide the government with the power to pro-
scribe it based on other elements.3 24 Therefore, if a beggar yelled
obscenities with a request for assistance, the government could pro-
scribe the obscene part of her speech, but it could not proscribe
the non-obscene part.125
Anti-begging ordinances also constitute viewpoint discrimination.
In considering the St. Paul ordinance proscribing bias-oriented
crimes, the Court found that it contained viewpoint discrimination.
The ordinance's effect would be to place restrictions on the speech
from one point of view that the opposite view need not observe.326
Because anti-begging ordinances would allow critics of beggars to
speak at their pleasure against giving money to the homeless, but
require the homeless to curtail their speech, the ordinance con-
tains a viewpoint-based distinction.
The majority in RA. V. indicated that three circumstances permit
content-based regulation of unprotected speech under the Consti-
324 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544.
325 Applying these principles to the St. Paul, Minnesota, Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance that prohibited, inter alia, racist activities, including cross-
burning on public or private property, the Court concluded that the
regulation was "facially unconstitutional." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547 (citing ST.
PAUL, MiNN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). Although as construed by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance reached only those expressions
constituting "fighting words," the regulation prohibited "fighting words" only
if "addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics" of race, color, creed,
religion or gender. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the "First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id. These same principles
demonstrate that prohibiting begging based on hostility towards the homeless
individual's "disfavored" message of destitution and despair cannot be
permitted consistent with the Constitution.
326 The Court noted the ordinance went "even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination .... [because] 'fighting
words' that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender -
aspersions upon a person's mother, for example - would seemingly be usable
ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc.
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by that speaker's opponents ....
St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle,
while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." Id. at 2547-
48.
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tution. First, content-based distinctions are constitutional if the dis-
tinction's basis is the same reason the entire class of speech is
unprotected. 2 7 Second, these distinctions are allowed if the classi-
fication's nature allows no realistic possibility that official suppres-
sion of ideas is afoot.3 28 Third, content distinctions may be drawn if
the affected speakers are associated with particular secondary
speech effects, so that the regulation is justified without reference
to the content of the speech.129 The Court found that none of
these exceptions applied to the statute at issue in RA.V. 330
These exceptions also do not apply to an ordinance that bans
begging while permitting solicitation by charitable organizations.
First, personal solicitation by beggars is not the reason the entire
class of speech is proscribable. The Court has repeatedly protected
personal solicitation on behalf of charities and religious organiza-
tions. 3 ' Second, the government may seek to suppress beggars and
their ideas due to compassion fatigue. 3 2
327 Id. at 2545. For example, a statute making it illegal to threaten
President Clinton's life would be constitutional "since the reasons why threats
of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the
fear of violence [and] ... the disruption fear engenders...) have special force
when applied to the person of the President." Id. at 2546. Justice White felt
that this exception "swallows the majority's rule." Id. at 2556 (White, J.,
concurring). Moreover, he felt that it should certainly apply to the St. Paul
ordinance since " 'the reasons why [fighting words] are outside the First
Amendment . . . have special force when applied to [groups that have
historically been subjected to discrimination].'" Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting the majority opinion, RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546).
328 Id. at 2547.
39 Id. at 2546 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(holding that zoning restriction applicable to adult movies theatres was
content-neutral because it was aimed only at secondary effects of theatres,
rather than intending "to suppress... the expression of unpopular views")).
The R.A.V. Court noted, for example, that a state could constitutionally
permit obscene live performances except those involving minors. RA.V., 112
S. Ct. at 2546. Justice White suggested as an example that, without this
exception, Title VII hostile work environment claims would be
unconstitutional unless the statute banned all harassment in the workplace,
not just sexual harassment. Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring).
330 Id. at 2548-49. Justice White described the majority's list of "ad hoc
exceptions" as "an effort to anticipate some of the questions that will arise
from its radical revision of First Amendment law." Id. at 2556 (White, J.,
concurring).
331 See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussing Schaumburg
and its progeny).
332 See supra notes 21-23, 32-35 and accompanying text.
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Finally, like the St. Paul ordinance, anti-begging ordinances regu-
late begging based on the primary effect of the speech - its persua-
sive (or repellant) force."' 3 Anti-begging ordinances are not
directed only to the secondary effects of the beggar's expressive
activities. The government could pursue other alternatives to deal
with the secondary effects of begging, such as traffic congestion,
coercive conduct and fraudulent solicitation. 3 4 Notably, the Court
in RA.V. questioned whether a statute that prohibits, rather than
merely regulates, a specified category of speech could ever be con-
sidered as directed only to the secondary effects of such speech. 3 5
Moreover, adverse reactions from people solicited by the beggar are
not the kind of secondary effects that justify a content-based restric-
tion. As the Court made clear in RA.V, the listener's reaction to
speech is, not a secondary effect that can justify content-based
regulation.3 3 6
s3 RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
334 The Court noted in RA.V. that "[t]he existence of adequate content-
neutral alternatives thus 'undercut[s] significantly' any defense of such a
statute.... casting considerable doubt on the government's protestations that
'the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and
effect of the law'. . . ." Id. (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1859
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329
(1988) (finding that consideration by Congress of less restrictive alternatives
undercut significantly defense and gravely weakened claim that statute
sufficiently narrowly tailored); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minneapolis
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983) (invalidating use tax on
products used by newspapers and finding asserted state interest of raising
revenues "unpersuasive" because alternative means could achieve same
interest without raising First Amendment concerns); infra notes 371-88 and
accompanying text (discussing less restrictive alternatives to blanket ban on
begging).
335 See RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549 ("Even assuming that an ordinance that
completely proscribes, rather than merely regulates, a specified category of
speech can ever be considered to be directed only to the secondary effects of
such speech, it is clear that the St. Paul ordinance is not directed to secondary
effects. .. ").
336 Id. (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
The Court's conclusion regarding the ordinance in RA.V applies with
equal force to anti-begging ordinances.
In fact the only interest distinctively served by the content
limitation is that of displaying the city council's special hostility
towards the particular biases thus singled out. That is precisely
what the First Amendment forbids ....
Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in
someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient
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Therefore, according to the majority's discriminatory content
analysis in RA. V, even if individual solicitation by a beggar is not
protected by the First Amendment, the government cannot pro-
scribe only certain types of individual solicitation (e.g., by a home-
less beggar) while permitting individual solicitation by other
individuals (e.g., by a fundraiser for a charitable organization).
However, the R.A.V opinion also seems to indicate that, as long as
the government proscribes all individual solicitation, the regulation
would pass constitutional muster.33 7 This result would seem to fail
means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the
First Amendment to the fire.
RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 (footnote omitted).
337 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, argued that this part of the
majority's opinion set "forth a new First Amendment principle that
prohibition of constitutionally proscribable speech cannot be
'underinclusiv[e]'. . . a First Amendment 'absolutism' whereby 'within a
particular "proscribable" category of expression.... a government must either
proscribe all speech or no speech at all.'" Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens felt that this "aspect of the Court's ruling
fundamentally misunderstands the role and constitutional status of content-
based regulations on speech, conflicts with the very nature of First
Amendment jurisprudence, and. . . . "severely contorts the fabric of settled
First Amendment law." Id. at 2562-64. Justice White elaborated on both the
legal inconsistencies and the practical difficulties with the majority's decision:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an
entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil
... but that the government may not treat a subset of that category
differently without violating the First Amendment; the content of
the subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of
constitutional protection.
Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Justice White felt that the majority's reasoning left "two options to
lawmakers attempting to regulate expressions of violence: (1) enact a sweep-
ing prohibition on an entire class of speech (thereby requiring 'regulat[ion]
for problems that do not exist'); or (2) not legislate at all." Id. at 2555 (altera-
tion in original); see also id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing
Court for deciding that "a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm
unless it also regulates speech that does not (setting law and logic on their
heads)"); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1525 (1993)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (commenting that Court's decision in overturning
Cincinnati's statute banning newsracks containing "commercial handbills"
while permitting newsracks containing newspapers, "places the city in the posi-
tion of having to decide between restricting more speech - fully protecting
speech - and allowing the proliferation of newsracks on its street comers to
continue unabated. It scarcely seems logical that the First Amendment com-
pels such a result.").
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under the Court's holdings in Schaumburg and its progeny.'" This
result would also harm the beggar because no one would be permit-
ted to solicit money on behalf of the homeless and the indigent.
Furthermore, this result seems contrary to both logic and what was
formerly thought to be settled First Amendment jurisprudence."s 9
B. The Scope of Anti-Begging Ordinances
1. Introduction
If a court finds that an anti-begging ordinance restricting beg-
gars' expressive activities in a public forum is content-neutral, the
scope of the regulation must also be examined. The Court must
determine whether the regulation restricts speech more broadly
than necessary to accomplish the proffered governmental interest.
Anti-begging ordinances are particularly vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge of their scope because they are frequently drafted
as broad, prophylactic rules. Such rules are inherently suspect
because they often result in the suppression of protected speech.34°
Even so, at least twenty states and Washington, D.C. passed laws that
338 See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussing Schaumburg
and cases following).
339 In fact, the "content discrimination" analysis of the majority in R.A.V.
was not without its critics on the Court. For example, Justice Stevens
commented in his concurrence: "Stated directly, the majority's position
cannot withstand scrutiny." R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He described the majority's "revision of the[ir] categorical
approach" as "an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland" that had turned "First
Amendment law on its head...." Id. at 2562-64. He also felt that the effect of
the Court's analysis was to provide the same sort of protection to fighting
words as is currently provided to core political speech. Id. at 2564-65.
Justice White also castigated the majority's opinion in his concurrence:
[T] he Court's theory does not work and will do nothing more than
confuse the law. . . . Its decision is an arid, doctrinaire
interpretation, driven by the frequently irresistible impulse of
judges to tinker with the First Amendment. The decision is
mischievous at best and will surely confuse the lower courts. Ijoin
the judgment, but not the folly of the opinion.
Id. at 2558-60 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, concurring, expressed "regret" at the opinion of the
majority which he felt "signals one of two possibilities: It will serve as prece-
dent for future cases, or it will not. Either result is disheartening." Id. at 2560
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
340 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988)
("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free experiences are suspect.")
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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impose broad, prophylactic bans on solicitation by individuals for
themselves, often as part of a statute regulating other conduct. For
example, many states prohibit begging as part of anti-vagrancy ordi-
nances.341 Six of these states prohibit begging as part of anti-loiter-
ing statutes.3 42 Connecticut, Massachusetts and Mississippi regard
begging as prima facie evidence that the person is a tramp. 343 A
341 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-340 (West 1990) ("[Vagrants
include] all beggars who go from door to door or beg in the highways."); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3302(6) (1981) (defining a vagrant as "any person wandering
abroad and begging, or who goes about from door to door or places himself in
or on an highway, passage, or other public place to beg or receive alms"); KAN.
CUM. CODE ANN. § 21-4108 (Vernon 1990) ("Vagrancy is: . . . (e) Deriving
support in whole or in part from begging."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
107 (West 1992) ("The following persons are and shall be guilty of vagrancy:
... (3) Able-bodied persons who beg or solicit alms"); MIN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.725(4) (1992) (finding that "a person who derives support in whole or
in part from begging" is a vagrant); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-37 (West 1992)
("[vagrants include] ... (g) Every able-bodied person who shall go begging for
a livelihood"); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.030(l)(d)-(e) (Michie 1986)
(defining vagrant as person who "accosts other persons in any public place ...
for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms" or " [g ] oes from house to house
begging food, money or other articles"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3901 (1991)
("A [vagrant is] a transient person, roving from place to place and living
without visible means of support, who begs."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.02 (West
1991) ("Any of the following are vagrants... (4) A person ... who derives part
of his support from begging or as a fortune teller or similar imposter.").
342 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-9(a)(1) (1992) (noting that person
commits crime of loitering if he loiters, remains or wanders about in public
place for purpose of begging); A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2905(A) (3) (1991)
(defining loitering as being "present in a public place to beg"); ARE. CODE
ANN. § 5-71-213(3) (Michie 1987); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-112(2) (West
1991) (stating that a "person commits [loitering] if he: (a) Loiters for the
purpose of begging"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1321(4) (1991) (noting that
person loiters when he wanders around in public place for purpose of
begging); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1991) (defining loiterer as
someone who "remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of
begging"). In a separate part of its anti-loitering statute, New York also defines
loitering as "remain [ing] in any transportation facility... for the purpose of
soliciting. . .. ." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35 (McKinney 1991).
343 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-336 (West 1990) (tramps include "[a]ll
transient persons who rove about from place to place begging.... Any act of
beggary ... by any person not a resident of this state, shall constitute prima
facie evidence that such person is a tramp"); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 63
(1992) ("Whoever... roves about from place to place begging ... shall be
deemed a tramp. An act of begging or soliciting alms, whether of money,
food, lodging or clothing ... shall be prima facie evidence that such person is
a tramp."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-29 (1991) ("any male persons over 16
years of age, and not blind, who shall go about from place to place begging
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beggar commits disorderly conduct by soliciting in Hawaii, Michi-
gan and North Carolina."' Georgia finds that beggars disrupt state
employees. 45 Utah imposes an oxymoronic fine of up to seventy-
five dollars for begging. 46 Moreover, at least six states specifically
prohibit the use of minors for begging in state dependency stat-
utes3 4 7 or in regulations prohibiting minors from engaging in that
occupation.3 4 8 As of February of 1992, at least thirteen of the states
and asking subsistence by charity . . . shall be held to be tramps.").
Mississippi's statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, because it applies only to men.
344 HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1101(e) (1985) ("A person commits the offense
of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause physical inconvenience or alarm
by a member... of the public, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he ...
[i]mpedes or obstructs, for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms, any
person in any public place"); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167(h) (West
1992) (defining as "disorderly" a "person found begging in a public place");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-444(a) (5) (1991) (finding person to be "disruptive in
public" who is "begging for money or other property" when intoxicated).
345 GA. CODE ANN. § 50-9-9 (Harrison 1992) (finding beggars disrupt "state
employees" if, "without the express written consent of the Director of the
Georgia Building Authority... any person .... beg[s], panhandle[s], [or]
solicit[s] ... within any buildings or on the grounds, sidewalks or other ways
owned by or under the control of the state").
346 UTAH CODE JUDICIAL ADMIN. app. C, ch.2, Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule
(Michie 1992) (setting fine for begging); UTAH ADMIN. R. 620-605-1 (1989)
("[b] egging is prohibited").
347 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-4 (1993) (defining one of the "criteria for
loss of parental custody" as occurring "if the child has been begging"); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 210.380 (1992) (providing that "[e]very minor who frequents any
street, alley or other place for the purpose of begging or receiving alms, or
who shall have no permanent place of abode" is considered a dependent
minor); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.090(1) (1986) (defining "neglected child,"
"delinquent child" or "child in need of supervision" as "any person less than
18 years of age... [w] ho is found begging, receiving or gathering alms, or who
is found in any street, road or public place for the purpose of so doing").
348 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1308 (West 1992) (finding "any person" guilty
of misdemeanor who "having the care, custody, or control of any minor under
the age of 16 years ... causes, procures, or encourages the minor to engage in
... begging"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 294.043 (1992) ("No child under sixteen
years of age shall be employed or permitted to work in any street occupation
connected with . . . begging"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 609.210(1) (1986) (finding
guilty of misdemeanor "[e]very person who employs.., exhibits.., any minor
... in begging, receiving alms, or in any mendicant occupation"); N.Y. ARTs &
CULT. AFF. LAw § 35.07(1) (c) (McKinney 1992) (finding it "unlawful for any
person to employ, use, or exhibit any child under sixteen years of age ... in
begging or receiving or soliciting alms in any manner or under any pretense,
or in any mendicant occupation").
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that do not prohibit begging as a matter of state law granted statu-
tory authority to city councils, s49 municipal authorities, 5 ° or parks
and recreation boards"' to prohibit begging.3 12 Several major cit-
ies have used this statutory authority to prohibit begging.35
3
The scope of blanket bans on begging may be subject to constitu-
tional challenge on two grounds. First, blanket bans may be chal-
lenged as unconstitutional prior restraints because they completely
silence the beggars' speech. Second, if a blanket ban on begging is
not a prior restraint, the regulation's scope may still be challenged
as an unconstitutional limitation on the time, place or manner of
solicitation in a public forum. Under this standard, the govern-
ment may only impose reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on
the time, place and manner of protected speech if the regulation is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and
leaves open alternative channels for communication. 54
In addition, the scope of an ordinance that does not impose a
blanket ban on begging, but instead attempts to regulate only beg-
gars' objectionable conduct, may be subject to constitutional chal-
lenge on due process grounds. This ordinance may be void for
vagueness if it fails to state with sufficient precision the unlawful
conduct. The Court requires precision in this area so that beggars
349 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-17 (Supp. 1990) (noting that city has
power to enact laws to retain and punish street beggars); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-179 (1991) (stating that "city may by ordinance prohibit or regulate
begging").
350 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 65, para. 11-5-4 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 7-32-4304 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 15-257 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40-48-
1(7) (West Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01(43) (1989); OHio REv.
CODE ANN. § 715.55B (Anderson 1992); WASH. Rsv. CODE § 35.22.280(34)
(1987); Wvo. STAT. § 15-1-103(a) (xvii) (Supp. 1990).
351 W. VA. CODE § 8-21-10 (1990) (proscribing begging in public parks).
352 See also, Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 32, at 896 n.5 (citing Young v.
New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 354 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(listing 12 states with such ordinances as of 1989), rev'd & vacated, 903 F.2d
146, 152 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990)).
353 See Diamond, supra note 20, at Al (indicating that twelve major cities
passed measures to curb begging during the period of 1988 to 1990); Knapp,
supra note 42, at 407 n.15 (specifying that as of 1991, the following major cities
had passed such regulations: Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Miami,
Florida; and Phoenix, Arizona).
354 International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711,
2720-21 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
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will know what conduct is prohibited, and authorities will not arbi-
trarily enforce the regulation against disfavored groups, such as the
homeless.
2. Blanket Bans on Begging as Prior Restraints
The Court has noted on numerous occasions that the First
Amendment's purpose is to prevent prior restraints on publica-
tions.35 Ordinances banning begging are nearly identical to classic
prior restraints by judicial injunction, because the regulations are a
priori determinations by the government that factual information
should not be disseminated. In Ward, the Court explained that
prior restraints give "public officials the power to deny use of a
forum in advance of actual expression."356 A blanket ban on beg-
ging authorizes governmental suppression of beggars' speech
before its expression. Thus, a blanket ban on begging might be
found to be a prior restraint, and would constitute "the most seri-
ous and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." 57 The Court has repeatedly stated that prior restraints
come before the Court bearing a heavy presumption against their
constitutionality."' 8 As Justice Brennan explained in Richmond
355 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) (citing Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 706, 723 (1931) (finding that court order restraining
media from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by
defendant violated First Amendment because "the heavy burden imposed as a
condition to securing a prior restraint was not met")).
356 Ward, 491 U.S. at 795 n.5 (quoting Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (finding that denial of municipal theatre for
production of "Hair" was impermissible prior restraint, reasoning that "the
danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment
freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's
use")).
357 Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559.
358 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (holding
unconstitutional as prior restraint Rhode Island commission that informally
censored books as "objectionable" for sale to youths because system "provides
no safeguards whatever against suppression of nonobscene and
constitutionally protected matter"); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570,
588 (Brennan, J., concurring); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (holding that state could not
constitutionally require newspaper to print reply of defamed candidate
because "[a]ccording to [the Court's] accepted jurisprudence, the First
Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between government
and the print media so far as government tampering, in advance of
publication, with news and editorial content is concerned"); Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971) (finding prior restraint on
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Newspapers v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 9 "[c]ustomarily, First
Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect communication
between speaker and listener. When so employed against prior
restraints, free speech protections are almost insurmountable."
Consequently, the Court has found prior restraints unconstitutional
in a variety of factual contexts.3 6 ° In fact, the Court has never
upheld a prior restraint on pure speech. 6 1
Nevertheless, the Court has frequently denied that First Amend-
ment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposi-
picketing and passing out literature not justified by designating conduct as
invasion of homeowner's privacy).
359 448 U.S. 555, 586-587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
360 See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S.
1301, 1306-08 (1974) (upholding stay of trial court order restraining
publication of information regarding rape-murder trial since order "impose [d]
significant prior restraints on media publication" that were "both pervasive
and of uncertain duration" and included "limitations on the timing as well as
the content of the media publication"); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968) (holding that injunction against public rally by members of "white
supremacist" group, without a hearing, constitutes unconstitutional prior
restraint that "suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment
sought to protect against abridgement"); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
57-58 (1965) (overturning statute requiring submission of motion pictures to
censorship board before release, holding that requirement "avoids
constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system," noting that "only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final
restraint"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)
(overturning as prior restraint New York's Education Law that forbade
commercial showing of any motion picture without license, which could be
denied based on censor's conclusion that film was "sacrilegious," finding that
"the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the
expression of those views... whether they appear in publications, speeches or
motion pictures"); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)
(invalidating, as impermissible prior restraint, discriminatory state tax on
advertising revenues of newspapers when purpose was to penalize publishers
of certain newspapers).
361 When confronted with such a restraint in New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers" case), the Court held that
newspapers could not be prohibited, even during a time of armed conflict in
Viet Nam, from publishing documents classified "TOP SECRET." The Court
held that the press was privileged to print the contents of the documents
despite the government's argument that publication would cause "grave,
irreparable injury to the nation." Id. at 714; see also id. at 725 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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tion that a prior restraint can never be employed. 62 For example,
in Near v. Minnesota,"'3 the Court found unconstitutional a statute
imposing a prior restraint on publication of an anti-Semitic newspa-
per. However, the Court hypothesized that there might be circum-
stances where speech meriting constitutional protection might
nevertheless be suppressed before publication based on a suffi-
ciently compelling governmental interest.3 64 For example, the
Court stated that "[n]o one would question but that a government
[in time of war] might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops."3 65 This so-called "military security
exception" was later construed in New York Times v. United States to
require proof that dissemination of the Pentagon Papers would
result in "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation
or its people."3 66
362 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
363 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
364 Id. at 716.
365 Id.
366 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (White, J., concurring); see also United
States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(applying exception to restrain journal from publishing article containing
technical details of hydrogen bomb construction).
The Court has upheld prior restraints regulating the time, place and
manner of expression regarding acts that are verbal in nature, such as
parades, if they do not unduly limit the opportunity for expression. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1960) (upholding Air Force regulation
requiring servicemen to obtain approval before circulating petitions on base
because regulation restricted "speech no more than is reasonably necessary to
protect the substantial governmental interest" in maintaining military
effectiveness); Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 474 (1975)
(upholding narrowly-drawn parade permit law). But see Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (overturning conviction of African-
American minister for leading civil rights march in violation of Alabama
regulation requiring parade permit because "without narrow, objective and
definite standards to guide the licensing authority," statute was
unconstitutional prior restraint); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273
(1951) (finding permit denial for Bible talks in city park was unconstitutional
prior restraint because city lacked standards in issuing licenses, holding that
"the completely arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to grant the permits was a
denial of equal protection."). A final group of permitted exceptions, to
suppress obscenity or incitements to violence or revolution by force, have
'come to be interpreted as situations in which the 'speech' involved is not
encompassed within the meaning of the First Amendment." Nebraska Press
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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In New York Times, the Court overturned a prior restraint even
when the dissemination of information could cause grave national
injury. Thus, the government probably could not meet its heavy
burden to show sufficient justification to defend an anti-begging
ordinance that the Court finds is a prior restraint. 6 7 In addition,
anti-begging ordinances do not involve military security concerns,
like those discussed in Near. Thus, if the Court considers a blanket
ban on begging a prior restraint, it would find the regulation
unconstitutional.1
68
3. Blanket Bans on Begging as Regulations of the Time, Place
or Manner of Beggars' Protected Speech in a Public
Forum
a. Introduction
If the Court finds that blanket bans on begging are not prior
restraints, these regulations remain subject to constitutional chal-
lenge as invalid restrictions on the time, place or manner of solicita-
tion in a public forum. The broad scope of blanket bans makes
them particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge that they
are not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est. The requirement that an ordinance be narrowly tailored
ensures that a protected speech regulation eliminates no more
speech than necessary to remedy the particular "evil."-3 69 To pass
constitutional scrutiny, the ordinance must not "deny or unwarrant-
367 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
368 Moreover, if anti-begging ordinances are regarded as penal sanctions
rather than as prior restraints, the Court's balancing test will weigh heavily in
favor of allowing the beggar to disseminate truthful information. The Court
in Daily Mail made it clear that whether that statute was defined as a prior
restraint or as a penal sanction was not dispositive, because penal sanctions
also require the highest form of state interest to sustain their constitutionality.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 100-02 (1979); see also Florida
Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (noting that whether Florida statute is
viewed as prior restraint or as penal sanction, "punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest
order"). Thus, the state is unlikely to meet its burden under either definition,
and a blanket ban on begging would probably be found unconstitutional.
369 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (finding against anti-abortion
picketers seeking to overturn city ordinance imposing ban on picketing
individual residences because city had substantial interest in allowing residents
with no ready means of avoiding picketers to be free of objectionable speech);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Precision of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.").
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edly abridge . . . the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions . .. "0 Because
the governmental interests most frequently proffered to justify anti-
begging ordinances could be accomplished by regulating objection-
able conduct, without prohibiting all begging, blanket bans are sub-
ject to constitutional challenge as an insufficiently tailored speech
restriction.
b. Blanket Bans on Begging as not Narrowly Tailored to Serve
Significant Governmental Interests
The governmental interests most frequently advanced to justify
blanket bans on begging at transportation nodes, or in the nation's
streets and parks, include such potentially significant concerns as
alleviating congestion, prohibiting coercive or threatening begging,
and preventing fraudulent solicitation. x For example, the New
York Transit Authority in Young asserted that begging "threatens
passenger well-being and safety" and "disrupts the [subway] system's
However, the narrow-tailoring requirement does not mandate that the
government employ the "least restrictive or least intrusive means of achieving
an end. The regulation must be reasonable and must not burden substantially
more speech than necessary." International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness
v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The Ward Court stated: "the
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the . . . regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.' . . . [T]he regulation will not be invalid
simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be
adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Ward, 491 U.S.
at 799-800 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
370 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581-82 n.18 (1980)
(citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (upholding state law
requiring special license for parade on public street)); see also Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (commenting that "First Amendment requires the Government
to justify every instance of abridgment. . . . If the Government cannot
adequately justify abridgment of protected expression, there is no reason why
citizens should be prevented from exercising the first of the rights
safeguarded by our Bill of Rights.").
371 In Loper, the Circuit Court noted that panhandlers have been known to
block the sidewalk, threaten those who do not give them money and "make
false and fraudulent representations to induce passers-by to part with their
money." Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir.
1993).
1994]
University of California, Davis
smooth operation." 72 The Port Authority advanced similar inter-
ests in Krishna to justify regulating leafletting and solicitations by a
religious organization in the airport terminals. The governmental
interests cited in Krishna included alleviating the disruption of busi-
ness and congestion caused by the Krishnas' activities, preventing
duress or coercion of air travelers, and stopping fraudulent
solicitation.3
7 3
However, the asserted governmental interests in a future case
challenging begging in a public forum cannot be evaluated in the
abstract. The government must establish the validity and suffi-
ciency of its interests in each future case because mere apprehen-
sion of difficulties is inadequate to overcome the right to free
expression. 74 In addition, these interests must be evaluated in
light of the character and context of the beggars' expressive activi-
ties in order to determine their significance in a particular case.
The Court found the governmental interests in Krishna constituted
a reasonable basis for regulating the Krishna's solicitation methods
in an airport terminal. The result might well be different if applied
to the solicitation methods of beggars in a public forum based on
the time, place and manner standard, which requires a significant
governmental interest.
More importantly, even a significant governmental interest in a
future case must be served by a narrowly tailored regulation. A
372 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). In discussing these interests, the Young court
noted: "In our estimation, the regulation at issue here is justified by
legitimate, indeed compelling, governmental interests." Id. at 158.
373 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2707-09 (1992).
374 Clark, 468 U.S. at 311 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even if passersby
claimed to be fearful of the beggars, this, in itself, would not be enough to
justify a blanket ban on begging. Over sixty years ago, in Whitney v. California,
Justice Brandeis commented: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt
women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears." 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(upholding constitutionality of California's Criminal Syndication Act on free
speech, due process and equal protection grounds, affirming defendant's
conviction for organizing Communist Labor Party); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435, 448-50 (1985) (overturning city's
denial of special use permit for group home for mentally retarded despite
community concerns, noting that "mere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses... and the like").
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blanket ban on begging will likely fail this step.375 For example,
congestion problems in most transportation nodes could also be
alleviated by limiting the areas where begging was permitted or
prohibiting begging at times when the facility is most crowded.376
A regulation prohibiting beggars from soliciting during subway
rush hours or at the place where a bus is momentarily due to arrive
might pass constitutional scrutiny. Justice Souter, concurring in
part and dissenting in part in Krishna, felt that the majority's con-
clusion that the Constitution forbids a ban on the sale, as well as the
distribution, of leaflets "puts to rest respondent's argument that
congestion justifies a total ban on solicitation."3 77 Although Justice
Souter acknowledged that there may be "congested locations where
solicitation could severely compromise the efficient flow of pedest-
rians, the proper response would be to tailor the restrictions to
those choke points. "378 As Justice Kennedy commented in his con-
currence in Krishna, "[i] nconvenience does not absolve the govern-
ment of its obligation to tolerate speech. The First Amendment is
often inconvenient.
379
Similarly, coercive, threatening or intimidating acts, if clearly
defined, "may be constitutionally prohibited by a statute that does
375 Justice Souter stated that the Court's "cases do not provide government
with plenary authority to ban solicitation just because it could be fraudulent."
Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2726 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He noted that "more than a laudable intent to prevent fraud [was]
required to sustain [a] ban" on solicitation like the regulation in Krishna (or in
many anti-begging ordinances). Id.; see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the
Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) ("In contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise,
and unduly burdensome rule . .. more benign and narrowly tailored options
are available. For example .... the State may vigorously enforce its antifraud
laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money on false
pretenses or by making false statements.").
376 For example, in Loper Judge Sweet opined that bans on begging
"immediately outside ATMs" or within "a ten-block radius from Grand Central
Station during the rush hour no doubt might constitute.., reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction [s]." Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F.
Supp. 1029, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
377 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2725 n.1 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
378 Id.
379 Id. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Chicago v. Terminiello,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (noting that "freedom of speech . . . is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest").
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not limit the freedom of speech of some citizens."380 In fact, states
already have statutes that prohibit such threatening acts as assault,
battery or breach of the peace.""' Justice Kennedy, concurring in
Krishna, noted that the federal government also has successfully
adopted regulations to deal with the serious problems associated
with solicitation.8 2 For example, the Federal Aviation Authority
permits the solicitation of funds in Washington, D.C. airports, but
has adopted special rules to prevent coercive, harassing or repeti-
tious behavior.383 If states and municipalities enact this type of reg-
ulation, then blanket bans on begging are unnecessary to deal with
the misconduct of individual beggars. In rejecting arguments that
California's anti-begging ordinance was needed to protect the pub-
lic from aggressive panhandling, the Blair court noted that to pro-
380 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
581 In Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991), the court
noted that California has "a plethora of content-neutral statutes with which
the population at large may be protected from threatening conduct." As
examples, the Blair court cited several sections of the California Penal Code.
Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324 n.10; CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1988)
(prohibiting assault); id. § 242 (prohibiting battery); id. § 415(1)-(3)
(prohibiting disturbing the peace by challenging someone to a fight,
disturbing another by loud noise or using offensive words). The district court
in Loper noted that the "overbearing beggar" in New York might violate a state
statute prohibiting "general harassment" while a "beggar shaking down people
in parking lots is both trespassing ... and extorting." Loper, 802 F. Supp. at
1046 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (prohibiting
general harassment); id. §§ 140.05-140.17 (prohibiting trespassing); id.
§ 155.05(2) (e) (prohibiting extortion)).
The Second Circuit in Loper pointed out that a panhandler is guilty of
disorderly conduct if she "uses obscene or abusive language or obstructs
pedestrians or vehicular traffic" with "intent to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm." Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 702
(2d Cir. 1993) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 240.20(3), (5) (McKinney 1989)). A
New York beggar "who accosts a person in a public place with intent to
defraud" commits "fraudulent accosting" while a panhandler who uses
"physical menace" to intentionally place another person "in fear of physical
injury" is guilty of "menacing." Loper, 999 F. 2d at 702 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 165.30(1) (McKinney 1989); id. § 120.15 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
382 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2721 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
383 Id. at 2722 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 159.94(e)-(h) (1993) (prohibiting, inter
alia, the following problems associated with solicitation: "threatening
gestures, or... language directed at another person in a manner intended to
harass that other person;" "intentionally touching or making physical contact
with another person" and "repeatedly attempting to . . . solicit funds from
another person when that other person has indicated to the solicitor that he
or she does not wish to ... make a donation")).
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tect the public "from intimidation, threats or coercion simply does
not require that a form of speech, possessing obvious political rele-
vance and pertinence to the community, which is of crucial public
importance to those that express the speech, be precluded.""8 4
Finally, even the governmental interest in preventing fraud can
be better served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition
on solicitation. The state can directly punish fraud."8 5 For exam-
ple, rather than banning all begging, states could adopt laws pun-
384 Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971), the Court held that the "claim that... expressions
were intended to exercise a coercive impact... does not remove them from
the reach of the First Amendment." The Keefe Court considered that, because
coercive speakers (like some beggars) intended to influence their listeners by
their activities, their role was "not fundamentally different from the function
of a newspaper." Id. In addition, even if a particular beggar is insistent "a
pedestrian on the street or airport concourse can simply walk away or walk
on." Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2725 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). For this reason, Justice Souter felt that the government's claimed
interest in Krishna in "preventing coercion was weak to start with." Id. He
pointed out that the "First Amendment inevitably requires people to put up
with annoyance and uninvited persuasion." Id. at 2725 n.1. Moreover, Justice
Souter recalled that the Court has protected speech in a "far more coercive
context than [an airport], that of a black boycott of white stores in Claiborne
County, Mississippi." Id. at 2725 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982)
(holding boycotters not liable for white merchants' business losses resulting
from boycotters' peaceful activities because "[s]peech does not lose its
protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
them into action")). Justice Souter concluded that, absent "any type of
coercive conduct, over and above the merely importunate character of the
open and public solicitation, that might justify a ban, . . . the regulation [in
Krishna] cannot be sustained to avoid coercion." Id. at 2726 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968); Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912).
385 Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637-
38 (1979) ("The Village may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms."). In Krishna,
Justice Souter pointed out that the Court's "cases do not provide government
with plenary authority to ban solicitation just because it could be fraudulent."
Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2726 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 792 (1988)
(acknowledging that, although "the interest in protecting charities (and the
public) from fraud [was] . . . a sufficiently substantial interest to justify a
narrowly tailored regulation," such interest did not justify speech restriction
when state had other means to prevent fraud, such as antifraud statutes and
disclosure requirements for charities).
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ishing fraudulent panhandling, while leaving nonfraudulent
solicitation unregulated. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Krishna,
found that the Port Authority's regulation was narrowly tailored
because, unlike blanket bans on begging, it did not burden any
broader category of speech than fraud and duress, and only prohib-
ited this behavior if continuous or repetitive.3 8 6 Anti-begging ordi-
nances could be patterned after the Port Authority's regulation to
target only continuous or repetitive solicitation that results in con-
gestion or fraud or commuter intimidation. These less restrictive
alternatives, which focus on the targeted evils without banning pro-
tected First Amendment activities, demonstrate that a total ban on
begging is not necessary to achieve asserted governmental interests.
The Court in Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for
Jesus,387 unanimously struck down a regulation that prohibited all
First Amendment activities in the Los Angeles International Air-
port. The Court found no justification for this ban even if the air-
port was a nonpublic forum, "because no conceivable governmental
interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech." 88
c. Anti-Begging Ordinances as Foreclosing Alternative Channels of
Communication
Finally, most anti-begging ordinances are also subject to constitu-
tional challenge because they do not offer ample alternative means
of solicitation to the politically powerless poor. The avenues of
social and political interaction open to the homeless are extremely
limited. The Court in Clark noted that, although the homeless are
numerically significant, they are "politically powerless inasmuch as
they lack the financial resources necessary to obtain access to many
of the most effective means of persuasion." 389 Consequently, public
fora like subway stations or bus depots offer invaluable avenues of
communication that are uniquely conducive to the successful
expression of the beggars' social message and pleas for assistance.
Studies prior to the enactment of the anti-begging ordinance in
Young revealed that approximately 3,500,000 commuters passed
through the New York subway system on an average work day.39 °
386 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
387 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
388 Id. at 575.
389 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 n.4
(1984).
390 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
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Similarly, the airports in the Krishna case served over 78 million
passengers.391 Thus, the New York subway system and the Port
Authority's airports represent particularly appropriate fora for the
beggars' form of expression, because they offer a uniquely diverse
cross-section of listeners. Indeed, as Justice Kennedy noted in his
concurrence in Krishna: "It is the very breadth and extent of the
public's use of airports that makes it imperative to protect speech
rights there." 92
Justice Kennedy also explicitly noted that, unlike a ban on beg-
ging, the Port Authority's regulation did not prohibit all solicita-
tion. The Krishnas could distribute pre-addressed envelopes so
potential contributors could mail their donations."' Although this
may be an ample alternative channel for a financially solvent, well-
organized corporation like the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, 94 this channel is not feasible for an indigent beggar
with no permanent address. If the Port Authority enforced its regu-
lation against the homeless, that would be tantamount to prohibit-
ing all solicitation. Justice Kennedy would apparently find such a
result constitutionally impermissible. He felt that the Port Author-
391 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Wolin v.
Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that more than
200,000 persons per day go through Port Authority's bus terminal, making it
appropriate place for anti-war demonstrator to "communicate his anti-war
protest to the general public" because it was place "where the relevant
audience may be found"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
392 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. at 2719 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Recognizing the
importance of reaching the public, the Krishna Court felt that the Port
Authority regulation left open ample alternative channels for communication
because the religious group was free to solicit on the sidewalk area outside the
terminals, which were "frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport
users," thus, "the resulting access of those who would solicit the general public
is quite complete." Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2709.
393 Krishna, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2723 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
394 Justice Souter, in his opinion in Krishna, felt that the Port Authority's
solicitation regulations did not leave open ample alternative channels of
communication even for the affluent International Society for Krishna
Consciousness:
A distribution of preaddressed envelopes is unlikely to be much of
an alternative. The practical reality of the regulation, which this
Court can never ignore, is that it shuts off a uniquely powerful
avenue of communication for organizations like the International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, and may, in effect, completely
prohibit unpopular and poorly funded groups from receiving
funds in response to protected solicitation.
Id. at 2727 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ity's "flat ban on the distribution or sale of printed material must
... fall in its entirety.""'5 Limiting beggars to soliciting by pre-
addressed, return envelopes would close the marketplace of ideas
to the homeless and the indigent, leaving speech open only to
those able to fund themselves.
If beggars are banned from soliciting in places where the public
congregates, like airports, subways and bus stations, the homeless
will have no chance to communicate their desperate messages.
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Barnes observed that requiring dancers
to don pasties and G-strings was a modest imposition and the mini-
mum necessary "to achieve the state's purpose of protecting societal
order and morality." 9 6 The imposition did not deprive the dance
of its message, it only made the message less graphic. 97 A ban on
begging is not a modest imposition on the beggars' message.
Rather, it deprives beggars of the opportunity to deliver their
message, and it deprives some beggars of their only chance for
survival.3
98
4. Anti-Begging Ordinances as Violating Due Process
Finally, if the Court finds that blanket bans on begging are
unconstitutional regulations of the time, place and manner of the
beggars' expressive activities, legislatures may respond by enacting
new ordinances purporting to regulate only the beggars' objection-
able conduct.3 9 9 In fact, many cities have passed ordinances regu-
lating "aggressive" or "coercive" panhandling.400 The circuit court
395 Id. at 2723 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Kennedy noted that a law that distinguishes between sales and
distribution closes the marketplace of ideas to the less affluent, leaving speech
as the preserve of those who can fund themselves. Id. at 2723-24.
396 Barnes v. Glen Theatres, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991).
397 Id.
398 In Young, the Court found that "what [was] ultimately at stake [was]
nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be
exhibited." Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). The
Court should also find that what is at stake with a blanket ban on begging is
not merely a limitation on the place where beggars can solicit. Rather, a
complete ban on begging may deny the beggar any place to solicit and would
keep the homeless, and the public problem they represent, out of sight and
out of mind.
399 In fact, San Francisco's "Aggressive Panhandling" statute was enacted as
a direct result of the district court's decision in Blair. See Blair v. Shanahan,
775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
400 See, e.g., DALLAs, TEX., Crrv CODE § 31-35 (1991) (prohibiting
.solicitation by coercion," including "persist[ing] in a solicitation after the
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in Loper gave an indication that such statutes might be found consti-
tutional. The court commented that "both the organizational solic-
itor and the individual solicitor are prosecutable for conduct that
oversteps the bounds of peaceful begging."4°" However, even an
anti-begging ordinance that merely attempts to regulate a beggar's
objectionable conduct may still be unconstitutionally void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.402
The void-for-vagueness test requires that a law give a per-
son of ordinary intelligence the ability to understand what acts
are prohibited, so that she may act accordingly, and that
the law provide explicit standards to prevent "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."" In Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
person solicited has given a negative response" and "engag[ing] in conduct
that would reasonably be construed as intended to compel or force a
solicitated person to accede to demands"); SAN FRANCisco, CAL., MUN. CODE
§ 120-1 (1992) (making it "unlawful for any person on the streets, sidewalks,
or other places open to the public.., to harass or hound another person for
the purpose of inducing that person to give money or other thing of value....
an individual ... harasses or hounds another ... when the solicitor closely
follows the solicitee and requests money or other thing of value, after the
solicitee has expressly or impliedly made it known to the solicitor that the
solicitee does not want to give money or other thing of value to the solicitor");
SEATT, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A-12-015 (1992) (prohibiting pedestrian
interference by aggressively begging "with intent to intimidate another person
into giving money or goods"); see also Knapp, supra note 42, at 408 n.15
(noting that Minneapolis (Minnesota) and Tulsa (Oklahoma) have similar
statutes regulating begging); Roger Conner, Aggressive Panhandling Laws: Do
These Statutes Violate The Constitution? No: A Solution To Intimidation, A.B.A. J.,
June 1993, at 41 (stating that prohibited conduct under recently enacted
"[aiggressive begging laws.... include: following before, after, or during the
course of asking for money;, touching people or screaming at them while
asking for money; accosting or blocking the passage of someone while asking
for money; asking for money in a confined space such as a bank lobby or a
subway tunnel; or asking for money in a clearly inappropriate, threatening or
intimidating setting, such as in front of an automated teller machine").
401 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1993).
402 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V;
see also Jordan Berns, Note, Is There Something Suspicious About The
Constitutionality Of Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717 (1989).
403 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (invalidating
portion of ordinance prohibiting picketing but upholding portion prohibiting
disruptive noise near school, noting that "vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning"); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
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ville,4° 4 the Court found unconstitutional an imprecise anti-
vagrancy law.4"5 The law at issue placed virtually "unfettered discre-
tion" in the hands of the police because it permitted arrest on suspi-
cion of past or future criminality.4°6 The Court explained that laws
lacking standards to control the exercise of discretion are danger-
ous. They provide a convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular
groups deemed to merit their displeasure."1 7 The Court noted
that a vague vagrancy or loitering law may disguise convictions that
could not be obtained with the real, but undisclosed, grounds for
arrest.
40 8
Because of these concerns, the Court has called for a more strin-
gent vagueness test when statutes threaten to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights, such as the right of free speech or
of association.4 ' The doctrine applies with particular force when
614 (1971) (striking down criminal statute prohibiting conduct that was
"annoying" to passersby, concluding that "[c ]onduct that annoys some people
does not annoy others," thus defendant would have to guess what conduct is
prohibited); Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (overturning on
vagueness grounds anti-gangster ordinance, defining gang as "two or more
persons," noting that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
404 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
405 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156-57 n.l (citing JAcKsoNILLE, FLA., CODE
§ 26-57 (1972) as providing that "[rlogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons
who go about begging.. . shall be deemed vagrants").
406 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164. The Court described such vagrancy laws as
"useful to the police" because they function as "nets making easy the roundup
of so-called undesirables" and rejected arguments that "vagrants" constitute
probable criminals. Id. at 171. The Court also noted that the statute "makes
criminal activities which by modem standards are normally innocent" making
it difficult for people to recognize that their actions might be subject to
criminal penalties. Id. at 163.
407 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97-98 (1940) (overturning conviction of labor union president, based on
Alabama statute prohibiting loitering and picketing, finding that regulation
"sweeps within its ambit ... activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute
an exercise of freedom of speech . . . [and] readily lends itself to harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against particular
groups deemed to merit their displeasure")); see also Goldman v. Knecht, 295
F. Supp. 897, 906-07 (D. Colo. 1969).
408 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 169.
409 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)
(upholding ordinance requiring business to obtain license for sale of items
used with marijuana, but noting that "perhaps the most important factor
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the challenged statute affects First Amendment rights. An unclear
law regulating speech might deter an individual from engaging in
speech or other protected expression.41 °
The Court may find an imprecise ordinance that regulates beg-
gars' conduct void for vagueness, either because the law does not
permit ordinarily intelligent beggars to know what conduct is pro-
hibited, or because it does not prevent compassion-fatigued police
officers from arbitrarily enforcing the regulation against the home-
less. In Young, the plaintiffs argued at the district court level that a
state law banning loitering for the purpose of panhandling in
Grand Central Terminal was a pretext for evicting the homeless
and destitute from the terminal.411 In response, the New York
Attorney General argued that the state law prohibited loitering for
the purpose of begging, not begging itself.412
In Young Judge Sand found that the statute failed to define and
give sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct, and therefore vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the State of
New York.413 Judge Sand noted that a person could loiter and not
beg, or beg and not loiter.414 On appeal, however, the Second Cir-
cuit determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the loitering charge.4"5
affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it
threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights"); see also
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("[S]tricter standards of
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a
potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act
at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.").
410 Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.
411 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 349 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), rev'd & vacated, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990). The New York statute provided as follows: '"A person is guilty of
loitering when he... [I] oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for
the purpose of begging." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989).
412 Young, 729 F. Supp. at 349-350.
413 Id. at 350.
414 Id.
415 Young, 903 F.2d at 163. A vagueness claim was also raised against New
York's anti-loitering statute in Loper. However, because that court found the
law violated the First Amendment, it was "not necessary for the Court to
address" the Fourteenth Amendment claim. Loper v. New York City Police
Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1037-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aft'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1993); see also State ex rel. Williams v. City Court of Tucson, 520 P.2d 1166,
1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting vagueness and overbreadth challenge to
statute similar to law in Young, holding that person of ordinary intelligence
would understand that "begging" would refer "to the solicitation of money or
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A similar constitutional challenge could be mounted against
municipal ordinances that ban "solicitation by coercion" or "aggres-
sive panhandling" because they fail to clearly define and give suffi-
cient notice of the conduct proscribed, and thus violate beggars'
due process rights.416 For example, Dallas' coercive solicitation reg-
ulation prohibits "persist[ing] in a solicitation after the person has
given a negative response"4 17 and San Francisco's "aggressive pan-
handling" law forbids "closely follow[ing] the solicitee and
request[ing] money" after the solicitee has "expressly or impliedly
made it known that" she does not want to give money.41 Both the
ordinances fail to clearly specify what conduct violates the regula-
tion. Do beggars persist in a solicitation if they explain how or why
the government has failed to assist them? Do they persist if they
remember every parent's admonition to say "please"? Do beggars
"closely follow" a solicitee if they cross the street at the same cor-
ner? Or do beggars have to remain stationary until the solicitee is
no longer in the vicinity?
The ordinances also fail to define precisely what action on the
part of the solicitee would constitute a negative response or what
would make it known that the solicitee does not want to give
money. Do solicitees have to say "no" or shake their heads to give a
negative response? Do solicitees "impliedly" say no simply by walk-
ing on? How are beggars to know if such solicitees are refusing to
give money or if they simply did not see or hear the beggars'
requests?
The imprecision in both ordinances also allows virtually unfet-
tered discretion for police in enforcing these laws. Regulations like
those enacted by Dallas and San Francisco might well result "in a
regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to
other valuable consideration without giving consideration in return"); State v.
Hundley, 142 S.E. 330, 332 (N.C. 1928) (upholding statute forbidding
begging or solicitation of funds on streets or in public places without permit
because governing body issuing permits did not have arbitrary power to
discriminate among applicants).
416 See Helen Hershkoff, Aggressive Panhandling Laws-Do These Statutes
Violate The Constitution? Yes: Silencing The Homeless, A.B.A. J.,June, 1993, at 40
(noting that anti-begging ordinances and aggressive panhandling regulations,
"like loitering laws to which they are historically related," raise serious due
process concerns because intended to silence homeless).
417 DALJAs, TEX., Crry CODE § 31-35, supra note 400.
418 SAN FRANcisco, CAL., MUN. CODE § 120-1, supra note 400.
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'stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police
officer,'" and thus would violate the Constitution. 419
CONCLUSION
This Article's in-depth analysis of begging's constitutionality leads
to the conclusion that a beggar's legal life is much like her everyday
life - a struggle for survival at every turn. The Court's complicated
First Amendment law has created a jurisprudential quicksand that
may sink the already floundering homeless beggar into constitu-
tional oblivion. A beggar's success in winning one part of a consti-
tutional challenge to an anti-begging ordinance can be trumped by
losing a later point.
Although the Court would likely extend its expansion of pro-
tected speech in cases like Barnes, RA. V., and Discovery Network, to
protect beggars' expressive activities, this issue has not yet been
decided in beggars' favor. However, if the Court ultimately decides
that beggars' speech is protected, it may be a hollow victory. The
Court's apparent deference to the government's ability to regulate
speech in public places in Krishna would foreclose beggars from
exercising their First Amendment rights in many places where they
could reach people who might respond to their pleas.
Similarly, beggars may successfully challenge an anti-begging
ordinance as a content-based or viewpoint-based regulation of indi-
vidual solicitation. However, that victory would be short-lived if the
constitutional quagmire created by the RA. V. decision is extended
to its logical conclusion. Under that decision, a legislature can cure
a content-based ordinance's constitutional flaw by passing a new
regulation prohibiting all forms of solicitation. Not only would the
beggars' voices remain silenced by such an ordinance, but so would
419 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (quoting
Shuttleworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (overturning defendant's
conviction under anti-loitering statute that "literally read... says that a person
may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police
officer. . . . The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no
demonstration")); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-8 (1983)
(citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (overturning defendant's
conviction for wearing American flag sewn to seat of trousers because statute
failed to "draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial
treatment that are criminal and those that are not")); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 107, 108-09 (1971) (explaining that vague law
"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application").
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the voices of others who solicit on behalf of beggars and similar
disadvantaged groups.
Beggars might be able to avoid this result by successfully chal-
lenging a blanket ban on solicitation as a prior restraint or as an
unconstitutional regulation of the time, place, and manner of beg-
gars' protected expression. However, the beggars' success might be
negated by the enactment of a statute purporting to regulate only
the beggars' objectionable conduct, but drafted broadly enough
that compassion-fatigued authorities could enforce the ordinance
against the homeless. The homeless beggars' future battles will
likely challenge such aggressive panhandling statutes as unconstitu-
tional violations of due process.
Thus, the Court's future interpretations of the First Amendment
will have far-reaching, and perhaps devastating, consequences for
the homeless. A compassionate judiciary may represent the last
chance for the survival of America's homeless citizens as well as for
other impoverished and subordinated groups. Unfortunately, even
the last bastion of hope for the indigent, the Supreme Court, may
be falling victim to public opinion and compassion fatigue. Legal
experts see an emerging emphasis on the needs of majorities rather
than the rights of minorities, and a growing deference to Congress,
state governments and state courts.4 21 With the departure of liberal
Justice Thurgood Marshall, and the appointment of Justice Clar-
ence Thomas, the Court appeared to have lost the lone dissenting
voice to champion the cause of the poor. As one legal commenta-
tor wrote at the time, "the present lineup on the Supreme Court, it
is widely agreed, will not engage in any ground-breaking discovery
of a governmental right to individual support."42' This dire predic-
tion may, however, be affected by the retirement of Justice Byron
White, which gave President Clinton his first chance to appoint
more liberal Justices to the Court. Bruce Fein, a conservative Court
commentator, opined that if President Clinton appointed a Justice
with leadership abilities, "that person may be able to forge coali-
tions with the Court's centrists, [leading to] more liberal [decisions]
on such issues as abortion, homosexual rights, affirmative action
and the First Amendment."4 22 Legal experts anticipate that Justice
420 Epstein, supra note 214, at 6A.
421 Presser, supra note 24, at 60.
422 HenryJ. Reske, "Pragmatic" White Retires, A.BA. J., May 1993, at 16.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who has filled Justice White's position, will
provide this leadership.4" 3
Unfortunately, even the most empathetic judiciary cannot solve
the problems of urban poverty and homelessness. The Second Cir-
cuit in Young opined that "it is not the role of this court to resolve
all the problems of the homeless, as sympathetic as we may be."424
Douglas Lasdon, Executive Director of the Legal Action Center for
the Homeless, who brought the Young action on behalf of two
homeless men and a class of indigents, commented that "[i] t's hard
to get real excited about winning the right to beg. Silencing poor
people will not solve hunger or homelessness. It's been our hope
that the public will focus their attention on the reason people
beg. "425
The sanctioning of compassion fatigue should not be condoned.
As District CourtJudge Sweet noted in his Loper opinion, "[i]f some
portion of society is offended, the answer is not in criminalizing
those people ... but addressing the root cause of their existence.
The root cause is not served by removing them from sight, however;
society is then just able to pretend they do not exist a little
longer. "426 Until society can resolve the problems of homelessness,
the judiciary should be careful not to banish those whose very pres-
ence indicates the need to address these problems. The First
Amendment must protect against compassion fatigue or any other
force that attempts to silence the voice of the destitute and lead the
homeless to become permanent constitutional castaways.
423 See, e.g., Top Court Moving To Middle Ground, S.J. MERCURY NEws, June 28,
1993, at 1E (quoting Georgetown University Law Professor David Cole ("The
effect of White's replacement [by Ginsburg] is the further solidification of the
center.")).
424 Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 156-57 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
425 Jason DeParle, Subway Panhandlers See Little From Legal Victory, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1990, at B1.
426 Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aftd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
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